The international community should encourage local peacebuilding while remaining clear about its limitations. A credible political negotiation is not defined by the number of people invited to speak. It is defined by the legitimacy of the parties, the openness of the agenda, the integrity of the procedures and the enforceability of the outcome.
By Martin S. Mungwa, Ph.D., Fellow ASCE
Contributor The Independentist News
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YAOUNDÉ – October 28, 2026 – Seven Years After the Failed 2019 Major National Dialogue, there are Five Tests of Institutional Readiness that Expose the Weaknesses of Yaoundé’s Latest Peace Initiative
WHEN COMMUNITY CONSULTATION IS PRESENTED AS POLITICAL NEGOTIATION
Why the distinction between reconciliation and conflict settlement matters; There is a fundamental difference between organizing a community meeting and negotiating the settlement of a prolonged political conflict.
A community meeting may encourage reconciliation, restore relationships and promote cooperation among people affected by violence. Political negotiations, however, require legitimate representation, mutually agreed procedures, substantive engagement with the underlying dispute and credible arrangements for implementing any settlement.
Confusing these two processes is not merely an administrative error. It risks transforming a serious political dispute into an exercise in public relations. This distinction lies at the center of the controversy surrounding the Community Dialogue initiative promoted by La République du Cameroun (LRC), whose governing authorities are characterized by Southern Cameroonian independence advocates as a colonial administration.
On September 28, 2026, LRC colonial Prime Minister Joseph Dion Ngute convened a Community Dialogue meeting in Buea. Another gathering followed in Bamenda on October 15, bringing together traditional rulers, religious authorities, civil society representatives, youth leaders and other community stakeholders.
These gatherings may serve useful purposes in local reconciliation. But they raise a fundamental question: can an administration that is itself a principal party to a political conflict unilaterally convene meetings, determine the participants and define the boundaries of discussion, then present the resulting exercise as an adequate substitute for negotiations with the opposing parties? The answer requires more than political rhetoric. It demands examination against recognized principles of international mediation and conflict resolution.
In my book, Southern Cameroons 2050: Why America Should Care, I developed a Five-Test Institutional Readiness Framework centered on legitimacy, administration, protection, production and external relations. Although originally designed to evaluate the institutional requirements of sustainable self-government, these five tests also provide a useful framework for assessing whether a proposed peace initiative possesses the foundations necessary for a durable political settlement.
Applied to the LRC colonial Community Dialogue initiative, they expose significant weaknesses.
- LEGITIMACY: REPRESENTATION BY COLONIAL INVITATION IS NOT A NEGOTIATING MANDATE
The first test asks who has authority to speak, negotiate and commit on behalf of the parties The legitimacy of participants is fundamental to any credible political negotiation.
Traditional rulers may possess customary authority. Religious leaders may command moral respect. Administrative officials may exercise statutory responsibilities. Civil society organizations may represent important community interests.
But none of these positions automatically confers authority to negotiate the political future of Southern Cameroons. The essential question is whether the participants possess a legitimate mandate from the constituencies whose political interests they claim to represent. An invitation from the LRC colonial administration cannot, by itself, establish that mandate.
The United Nations’ Guidance for Effective Mediation identifies consent, impartiality and inclusivity among the foundations of credible mediation. These principles are relevant because a political settlement must command sufficient acceptance among the principal parties and affected constituencies to have a reasonable prospect of implementation.
The LRC colonial administration must therefore explain who represents the Southern Cameroonian political claim, how those representatives are selected, what authority they possess and whether they can freely negotiate the underlying political dispute. It must also explain whether the principal political and armed actors are participating directly or through genuinely authorized representatives.
The presence of respected traditional and religious authorities may contribute to reconciliation, but it cannot automatically substitute for engagement with the principal conflict parties. A meeting may be inclusive in its social composition while remaining inadequate in its political representation. Representation by colonial invitation is not the same as representation through a legitimate negotiating mandate.
- ADMINISTRATION: THE UNFINISHED CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS OF 1961
Why historical documentation and constitutional arrangements must form part of credible negotiations . The second test concerns administration and institutional authority.
The Southern Cameroons conflict cannot be adequately understood as an isolated breakdown in community relations. Its political dimensions include contested constitutional arrangements, historical grievances, institutional authority, representation and the future relationship between Southern Cameroons and LRC.
The documentary record surrounding the 1961 political transition remains particularly important. On April 21, 1961, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 1608 (XV), addressing the future of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration.
The resolution endorsed the plebiscite outcome under which Southern Cameroons would achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroun. It also provided for termination of the Trusteeship Agreement concerning Southern Cameroons on October 1, 1961.
Significantly, paragraph 5 invited the United Kingdom, the Government of Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroun to undertake urgent discussions to finalize the arrangements necessary to implement the parties’ agreed policies before that date.
This provision demonstrates that the United Nations contemplated discussions concerning the implementation of the transition. However, historical and legal precision is essential.
Resolution 1608 (XV) did not itself declare the subsequent union invalid. Nor does paragraph 5, considered in isolation, settle contemporary disputes concerning sovereignty or constitutional legitimacy.
Those questions require examination of the broader historical record, subsequent constitutional developments and applicable international law.
Nevertheless, the resolution remains a central documentary reference for understanding the historical foundations of the Southern Cameroons question. Any serious political negotiation should permit these contested matters to be examined.
The difficulty with the Community Dialogue initiative is that the publicly reported discussions have concentrated on reconciliation, local security, reintegration and development rather than a mutually agreed constitutional negotiating agenda. These concerns are important, but they do not exhaust the underlying political dispute.
If the constitutional outcome is predetermined, participants may be invited to discuss how to live within an existing arrangement without being permitted to negotiate the arrangement itself. That is a fundamentally different exercise.
A genuine political negotiation must allow the parties to examine the disputed constitutional questions rather than require acceptance of one party’s preferred outcome before negotiations begin.
- PROTECTION: PEACE WITHOUT CREDIBLE SECURITY GUARANTEES IS FRAGILE
Why civilian protection, confidence-building and independent verification are essential The third test concerns protection. After years of armed conflict, displacement, interrupted education and economic disruption, the restoration of public confidence requires more than speeches and ceremonial declarations. It requires credible security arrangements.
Southern Cameroonian civilians have suffered profoundly during the conflict. Allegations of abuses involving state security forces and armed separatist groups have raised serious concerns about civilian protection and accountability. Any credible settlement must address violations regardless of the political affiliation of those responsible.
A serious negotiating framework should therefore consider civilian safety, humanitarian access, the treatment of conflict-related detainees, security guarantees for negotiators and independently verifiable arrangements for reducing hostilities. These matters cannot be resolved through declarations of goodwill alone.
The LRC colonial administration must demonstrate how its proposed process can create an environment in which participants may express opposing political positions without intimidation or retaliation. Negotiation requires more than the physical presence of participants. It requires a reasonable assurance that disagreement can be expressed safely.
Similarly, the reintegration of individual fighters can contribute to peacebuilding, but it cannot substitute for a comprehensive political and security settlement. The credibility of a peace initiative depends not simply on whether participants are invited to speak, but on whether they can negotiate freely and safely.
- PRODUCTION: PEACE MUST RESTORE THE ECONOMIC CAPACITY OF SOUTHERN CAMEROONS
Why reconstruction, productive sovereignty and accountable institutions belong at the negotiating table The fourth test concerns production. The purpose of peace cannot be limited to ending armed confrontations. It must also include restoring productive capacity and creating the institutional conditions for sustainable prosperity.
The prolonged conflict has damaged agriculture, commerce, education, transportation infrastructure and private investment. Families have lost homes and livelihoods. Businesses have closed or relocated. Young people have experienced interrupted schooling and diminished economic opportunities.
A durable settlement must therefore address reconstruction and economic governance. Who will determine development priorities? How will public revenues be administered? What safeguards will protect property rights and productive investment? How will displaced families recover their livelihoods? What institutional arrangements will ensure transparent and accountable reconstruction? These questions are central to the concept of productive sovereignty developed in Southern Cameroons 2050.
The framework emphasizes that political institutions must ultimately be evaluated by their ability to protect people, generate opportunity and sustain economic life. Reports from the October 2026 Bamenda gathering indicate that participants raised concerns about employment, public infrastructure, services and reintegration.
These are legitimate priorities. However, local development initiatives do not automatically constitute a negotiated economic settlement between the principal conflict parties. A reconstruction program administered unilaterally by one party may provide practical benefits without resolving disagreements concerning institutional authority and economic self-government. Peace that restores infrastructure without addressing the contested institutions responsible for governing that infrastructure may remain politically fragile.
- EXTERNAL RELATIONS: WHERE IS THE CREDIBLE INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION FRAMEWORK?
Why impartial facilitation and mutually agreed procedures matter. The fifth test concerns external relations. Not every political conflict requires international mediation. Parties can negotiate effectively without external involvement when sufficient trust and institutional capacity exist.
However, where the principal parties fundamentally disagree about political authority and legitimacy, mutually accepted third-party facilitation may help establish the procedures necessary for meaningful negotiations.
The United Nations’ Guidance for Effective Mediation recognizes consent, impartiality, inclusivity, preparedness, respect for international law and the quality of resulting agreements among the essential considerations in mediation. These principles do not prescribe a single formula for every conflict. They do establish important standards for evaluating whether a proposed negotiating process is credible.
The LRC Community Dialogue initiative therefore raises several questions. Has an impartial facilitator been accepted by the principal parties? Have the parties agreed upon the negotiating agenda? Are there procedures for verifying commitments? What arrangements would ensure implementation of any agreement reached?
The publicly available descriptions of the 2026 gatherings do not establish that such arrangements have been agreed upon. This does not prove that every possible channel of negotiation has been rejected. It does mean that the publicly presented Community Dialogue should not be confused with a fully constituted political negotiation process.
A government-led consultation does not become an internationally credible peace negotiation merely because its organizers describe it as dialogue.
THE 2019 MAJOR NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND THE 2026 COMMUNITY DIALOGUE: SEVEN YEARS LATER, WHAT HAS FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED?
The experience of 2019 exposes the danger of repeating a process without correcting its structural weaknesses Any serious assessment of the LRC colonial administration’s 2026 Community Dialogue must begin with the experience of the 2019 Major National Dialogue.
The two initiatives emerged under different circumstances and adopted somewhat different approaches, yet they raise a remarkably similar question: can a political conflict be resolved through a process designed and controlled principally by one party to that conflict?
Between September 30 and October 4, 2019, the LRC administration convened the Major National Dialogue in Yaoundé. The gathering attracted more than a thousand participants from government institutions, political organizations, traditional authorities, religious institutions, civil society and professional associations.
Its stated objectives included restoring peace, addressing grievances in the English-speaking regions, promoting decentralization and developing measures for reconstruction and reintegration.
The meeting produced several institutional recommendations, including special status for the North-West and South-West Regions, regional institutions, measures intended to strengthen bilingualism and initiatives supporting displaced populations. These outcomes should be acknowledged. Nevertheless, their existence does not demonstrate that the underlying political dispute was negotiated or resolved.
The central weakness of the 2019 process was the absence of important separatist leaders and organizations whose political objectives constituted a principal dimension of the conflict. A subsequent United Nations report confirmed the nonparticipation of secessionist leaders, while Human Rights Watch independently documented the absence of major separatist groups and important opposition participants.
Consequently, although the Major National Dialogue produced administrative and institutional recommendations, it did not secure a comprehensive political settlement. Armed hostilities continued. Communities remained divided. The fundamental disagreement concerning the political future of Southern Cameroons persisted.
Seven years later, the LRC colonial administration introduced another initiative under the designation of Community Dialogue. The meetings held in Buea on September 28, 2026, and Bamenda on October 15, 2026, brought together traditional rulers, religious leaders, civil society representatives, youth organizations and other stakeholders.
Public reporting indicates that discussions focused on peace, local security, reconstruction, reintegration and restoration of normal economic and social activities. These objectives are not inherently objectionable. Communities devastated by prolonged conflict urgently need security, functioning schools, infrastructure and opportunities to rebuild their livelihoods.
However, the essential question is whether the 2026 initiative has corrected the structural weaknesses that limited the effectiveness of the 2019 dialogue. The available public record does not demonstrate that it has. In 2019, the LRC administration convened the process and determined the constitutional framework within which participants would deliberate.
In 2026, the same administration remains the principal convening authority, while publicly reported proceedings continue to emphasize consultation with traditional, religious and community representatives. In neither case has the reviewed evidence established a mutually agreed negotiating framework through which the principal political parties can freely examine the fundamental constitutional dispute. The distinction is significant.
A government may legitimately consult communities about public services, development and local security. Such consultation may improve governance and contribute to reconciliation. But consultation conducted within an existing administrative structure is not necessarily equivalent to negotiations concerning the legitimacy, authority or future configuration of that structure.
The distinction becomes especially important when the political dispute itself concerns the authority of the administration organizing the consultation. The 2019 Major National Dialogue attempted to address the conflict principally through institutional reform and administrative accommodation within the existing constitutional order.
The 2026 Community Dialogue appears, from the proceedings publicly reported, to place greater emphasis on grassroots reconciliation, local development and encouraging armed actors to abandon violence. These differences should be recognized. Nevertheless, neither approach can be regarded as a comprehensive political settlement unless it establishes a credible mechanism for addressing the fundamental political questions that remain contested.
This is where the Five-Test Institutional Readiness Framework developed in Southern Cameroons 2050 becomes particularly relevant. The legitimacy test examines whether participants possess credible authority to negotiate on behalf of their constituencies.
The administration test considers whether the process can address the constitutional and institutional arrangements necessary for settlement.
The protection test examines whether civilians and negotiators can rely upon meaningful security guarantees.
The production test evaluates whether the settlement can restore economic opportunity and establish accountable institutions.
The external-relations test considers whether appropriate diplomatic arrangements, impartial facilitation and credible implementation mechanisms support the process.
Applied to the initiatives of 2019 and 2026, these tests expose a persistent concern. The LRC colonial administration has emphasized dialogue as a mechanism for restoring peace, but the publicly documented processes have not established how the principal political dispute would be negotiated through procedures mutually accepted by the conflict parties.
The 2019 experience should therefore serve as a warning. The existence of a conference, the participation of respected community figures and the adoption of institutional recommendations do not, individually or collectively, guarantee a sustainable settlement.
Neither does the continuation of armed conflict prove that every institutional measure emerging from the earlier dialogue was without value. Some reforms may provide practical benefits even when the broader dispute remains unresolved.
The appropriate standard is whether those measures have addressed the principal causes of the conflict and established conditions for durable peace. By that standard, the continuation of the conflict seven years after the Major National Dialogue raises serious questions about the adequacy of the approach.
The lesson of 2019 is not that dialogue should be abandoned. It is that dialogue must be designed to confront the actual dispute. Seven years of experience should have taught the LRC colonial administration that gathering communities to discuss peace is not the same as bringing the principal parties together to negotiate it.
A PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE: FIVE STEPS TOWARD CREDIBLE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS
Moving beyond criticism toward a structured and implementable peace process. A constructive criticism of Community Dialogue should be accompanied by a workable alternative.
The first requirement is legitimate political representation. The principal parties must establish how their delegations will be constituted and what authority they possess. Appropriate participation by civil society, women, displaced communities and other affected constituencies should also be incorporated.
The second requirement is an agreed negotiating agenda. The parties should develop written terms of reference addressing the political dispute, constitutional arrangements, humanitarian protection, security, reconstruction and implementation. No final constitutional outcome should be imposed as a prerequisite for participating.
The third requirement is credible confidence-building. The parties should explore practical arrangements concerning humanitarian access, civilian protection, conflict-related detainees and safe participation in negotiations. Measures adopted should be documented and capable of verification.
The fourth requirement is mutually acceptable facilitation. Where direct engagement is insufficient, a neutral facilitator supported by appropriate regional or international institutions could assist the parties. The facilitator’s mandate should be established through agreement rather than unilateral appointment.
The fifth requirement is an enforceable implementation framework. Any eventual settlement should identify responsibilities, measurable commitments, timelines, monitoring arrangements and procedures for resolving disputes concerning compliance. These measures would not guarantee agreement.
No credible mediator can guarantee that conflicting parties will reach a settlement. But they would establish a more legitimate and defensible foundation for negotiations. Most importantly, they would distinguish genuine political negotiation from consultation conducted entirely within one party’s preferred constitutional framework.
CONCLUSION: PEACE CANNOT BE MANUFACTURED THROUGH COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
The international community must distinguish meaningful reconciliation from a negotiated political settlement The fundamental weakness of the LRC colonial Community Dialogue initiative is not that communities are being encouraged to pursue reconciliation. Community reconciliation is necessary.
Traditional rulers, religious leaders, women’s organizations, youth associations and civil society institutions can make important contributions to restoring relationships and protecting vulnerable populations. Their role deserves recognition.
But community reconciliation and political negotiation remain distinct processes.The first seeks to repair relationships within society. The second must address the political and institutional arrangements underlying the conflict. One cannot automatically substitute for the other.
Southern Cameroons 2050: Why America Should Care provides five tests for evaluating institutional readiness: legitimacy, administration, protection, production and external relations. Applied to the publicly described Community Dialogue initiative, these tests expose significant questions that remain unanswered.
The experience of 2019 demonstrates why those questions matter. A dialogue may attract extensive participation, produce recommendations and establish administrative institutions without resolving the political dispute that led to its creation. Seven years later, the central challenge remains substantially the same.
Southern Cameroons does not merely need another meeting. It needs a credible negotiating process in which the principal parties can examine their political differences, develop enforceable commitments and pursue a peaceful settlement.
The international community should encourage local peacebuilding while remaining clear about its limitations. A credible political negotiation is not defined by the number of people invited to speak. It is defined by the legitimacy of the parties, the openness of the agenda, the integrity of the procedures and the enforceability of the outcome.
Until those requirements are addressed, presenting LRC’s colonial Community Dialogue as an adequate settlement mechanism would be premature. A durable peace cannot be manufactured through administrative declarations. A legitimate negotiating mandate cannot be created simply by issuing invitations.
And an unresolved political dispute cannot be settled through a process that avoids the central questions at its foundation. Southern Cameroons needs a negotiation process capable of addressing the dispute itself, not another consultation that leaves its political foundations untouched.
SELECTED REFERENCES
Mungwa, Martin S. Southern Cameroons 2050: Why America Should Care. Five-Test Institutional Readiness Framework.
United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 1608 (XV), The Future of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, April 21, 1961.
United Nations. Guidance for Effective Mediation, 2012.
United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 70/304, Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, 2016.
United Nations Secretary-General. Report on the Strengthening of the Role of Mediation, A/76/253, 2021.
Human Rights Watch. They Are Destroying Our Future: Armed Separatist Attacks on Students, Teachers, and Schools in Cameroon’s Anglophone Regions, 2021.
Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon. Presidential Address Announcing the Major National Dialogue, September 10, 2019.
Bamenda City Council. Reporting on the Prime Minister’s October 14–15, 2026 working visit.
The Post Newspaper. Reporting on the Community Dialogue meeting in Bamenda, October 2026.
As Amazon associate this site earns from qualifying purchases
Get you copy of the book southern Cameroons 2050; why America should care By Martin Mungwa on Amazon
Martin S. Mungwa, Ph.D., Fellow ASCE
Contributor The Independentist News
