THE CARETAKER PRESIDENCY: PAUL BIYA, FRANCE, AND CAMEROON’S UNFINISHED INDEPENDENCE

Formal independence occurred in 1960. But independence is not completed by a date. It is completed when a people possess the institutions, economic capacity, political freedom, and strategic confidence to determine their own future.

By Uchiba Nelson, Contributor The Independentist News

As Amazon associate this site earns from qualifying purchases

Its back to school, equip yourself from Amazon

https://www.amazon.com/s?k=back+to+school+equipments&crid=3GXUMB4TGGVEF&sprefix=back+to+school+equipments%2Caps%2C2229&linkCode=ll2&tag=njokings-20&linkId=e667fffdf69f4dcbae87b0b7bfa17c01&language=en_US&ref_=as_li_ss_tl

YAOUNDÉ – 25 August 2026 – For more than four decades, citizens of La République du Cameroun have asked a familiar question: What has Paul Biya really accomplished after more than 43 years in power? But perhaps that is not the most important question. The more difficult question is this: Does Paul Biya possess the political will—and the sovereign room—to undertake the kind of transformation Cameroonians expect from him? My answer is No.

The problem is larger than Paul Biya as an individual. It concerns the political and economic architecture inherited from France at independence and the extent to which that architecture continues to shape the choices available to leaders in Francophone Africa. Biya may be the face of the system, but he did not create the system. His long presidency has instead become one of its most durable expressions.

Independence Without Full Sovereignty?

French Cameroun formally became independent on January 1, 1960. Yet formal independence did not automatically erase the dense network of political, monetary, military, economic, diplomatic, and institutional relationships developed with France. That distinction matters. A flag may symbolize independence. An anthem may proclaim it. A presidency may administer it. But sovereignty asks harder questions.

Who controls the most important strategic decisions? Who defines the terms under which natural resources are developed? Who determines monetary arrangements? Who benefits from major concessions and contracts? How much freedom does a government possess when its priorities conflict with those of powerful external partners?

And when a political elite believes that international approval is essential to remaining secure in office, where does domestic sovereignty end and external influence begin? These questions are more important than slogans about independence. They go to the heart of whether political independence has matured into genuine national sovereignty.

Paul Biya as Caretaker of an Inherited System

Paul Biya’s presidency has been characterized by extraordinary continuity. That continuity is usually discussed in terms of longevity, elections, opposition politics, constitutional changes, and succession. But another way of looking at his presidency is to ask what political system he has spent four decades preserving.

Biya has generally maintained close relations with France and with the broader Western diplomatic establishment. His governments have not undertaken the kind of fundamental rupture with the inherited Francophone order seen more recently in parts of the Sahel. This is why I describe his presidency as a caretaker presidency.

The term does not mean that every decision in Yaoundé is dictated from Paris. Such a claim would be too simplistic and would require evidence far beyond political suspicion. It means something more structural. Biya has governed largely as the custodian of an inherited political order whose foundations were laid before and immediately after independence. He has managed the system more than he has transformed it. And that may help explain why so many citizens continue to expect dramatic national renewal from a presidency whose operating logic has been continuity.

Ahidjo, Biya, and the Question of French Influence

There was measurable economic and infrastructural development under Ahmadou Ahidjo. Yet the transfer of power to Paul Biya in 1982 did not fundamentally alter Cameroon’s close strategic relationship with France. For decades, critics of French influence in Africa have argued that post-independence cooperation agreements, monetary structures, military arrangements, privileged commercial relationships, and diplomatic networks allowed Paris to retain significant influence across its former African territories. Cameroon must be understood within that wider history.

The important question is therefore not whether France personally makes every political decision in Cameroon. The important question is: How much independent strategic space does the Cameroonian state actually possess? That is a question citizens should be able to ask without being dismissed as conspiratorial or anti-French. A sovereign state should be capable of reviewing inherited arrangements and determining whether they still serve national interests.

The CFA Franc and the Meaning of Economic Independence

The debate surrounding the CFA franc illustrates the wider sovereignty problem. The issue is larger than currency. It concerns control. Who determines monetary policy? How are reserves managed? What institutional guarantees exist? Who benefits from stability? Who bears the cost of limited monetary flexibility? What alternatives are available? And how much room does an African government possess to pursue independent monetary priorities? Supporters of the CFA system point to monetary stability and convertibility.

Critics argue that it preserves an unequal postcolonial relationship. Both arguments deserve serious economic examination. But the political lesson is unavoidable: Formal independence and economic sovereignty are not necessarily the same thing. A country may possess a national flag while major economic decisions remain constrained by arrangements inherited from another era.

Fru Ndi and the Politics of “France Must Go”

This tension was visible during the political opening of the early 1990s. Ni John Fru Ndi and the Social Democratic Front challenged not merely the domestic political establishment but also the international relationships many opposition supporters believed sustained it.

The slogan linking Biya’s departure with the departure of French influence captured a broader popular suspicion: that political change inside Cameroon could not be separated from the external relationships surrounding the state. It would be irresponsible to state without evidence that France alone determined particular electoral outcomes. But the widespread perception that France favored continuity in Yaoundé became part of the political consciousness of the period. That perception has never completely disappeared.

Maurice Kamto and a Changing Francophone Africa

Maurice Kamto entered national politics in a very different international environment. Across Francophone Africa, a new generation has increasingly questioned old relationships with France. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have all, in different ways and under very different political circumstances, challenged longstanding French military and diplomatic influence.

Whether one agrees with those governments or not, their actions have reopened questions many African states avoided for decades. What does sovereignty actually require? How much strategic autonomy should an African government possess? Can inherited military or economic arrangements be renegotiated? What happens when relations with a former colonial power no longer reflect domestic political expectations? Cameroon cannot remain permanently outside that debate.

Issa Tchiroma, Franck Biya, and the Post-Biya Question

As attention increasingly turns toward the era after Paul Biya, political discussion often becomes focused on personalities. Who succeeds him? Could it be Franck Biya? Could another establishment figure emerge? Could an opposition figure reshape the system? Could Issa Tchiroma or another political actor become part of a post-Biya realignment? But the more important question is not simply who occupies the presidency. It is: What system will that person inherit, and whose interests will that system continue to protect?

External powers will naturally assess any future Cameroonian leadership according to their own interests. France will have interests. The United States will have interests. China will have interests. Russia will have interests. Regional governments will have interests. Investors will have interests. That is normal international politics.

The responsibility of Cameroonians, however, is to ensure that the interests of the Cameroonian people do not become secondary to everybody else’s. The real succession question is therefore not: Who comes after Biya? It is: Will Cameroon simply receive a new caretaker?

Jean de Dieu Momo and the Uncomfortable Question

Jean de Dieu Momo once expressed, in substance, a provocative interpretation of the Southern Cameroons position: “If you want us to be together, get out from France or allow us alone.” Whatever one’s opinion of Momo or the politics surrounding the statement, it exposes a deeper constitutional contradiction. Southern Cameroons and French Cameroun did not emerge from identical colonial experiences. They inherited different legal traditions. Different educational systems. Different administrative structures. Different political cultures. Different relationships with former colonial powers.

The crisis that developed between them therefore cannot be reduced simply to language. The problem was not merely that one group spoke English while another spoke French. The deeper question concerned how two territories carrying different institutional inheritances were expected to coexist politically. And what happened when one system gradually became dominant.

Southern Cameroons Exposes a Deeper Contradiction

This is where the Southern Cameroons question becomes especially important. Southern Cameroonians are engaged in their own struggle over identity, political status, sovereignty, constitutional history, and the future. But La République du Cameroun faces a sovereignty question of its own. These are not identical struggles. They should not be confused. Yet they intersect in one important way. Southern Cameroons entered the post-1961 political relationship with a distinct British-derived administrative, educational, legal, and institutional inheritance. French Cameroun entered with another system, one already closely connected to France.

If that postcolonial French-derived structure ultimately became the dominant framework governing both territories, then the Southern Cameroons problem cannot be separated entirely from the unresolved sovereignty of La République du Cameroun itself. That is why calling the conflict merely an “Anglophone crisis” is inadequate. It reduces a constitutional and political-status problem to a language problem.

Do Not Fight Southern Cameroons—Examine Your Own Sovereignty

Citizens of La République du Cameroun may therefore wish to confront an uncomfortable possibility. Instead of directing so much political and military energy toward suppressing the Southern Cameroons question, perhaps they should also examine the condition of their own sovereignty. Who controls their political destiny? Who owns major productive assets? Who benefits from natural resources? Who signs the largest agreements? Where does capital circulate? How much leaves? How much remains? Who determines the country’s strategic direction? And why has political succession remained so difficult after more than four decades under one president? These are not merely Southern Cameroonian questions. They are Cameroonian questions. Indeed, they are African questions.

The Sahel and the Price of Sovereignty

The experience of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger has injected a new vocabulary into Francophone African politics. Sovereignty. Strategic autonomy. Foreign troops. Currency. Natural resources. Military agreements. External influence. The Sahel governments have taken dramatic steps against French influence. Those choices come with serious risks and should not automatically be romanticized. Rejecting one external power does not guarantee democratic government. Replacing French influence with Russian influence would not itself constitute sovereignty.

Changing partners without changing dependency simply changes the name of the dependency. That is the deeper lesson. Sovereignty is not the rejection of one foreign power. It is the capacity to deal with all foreign powers from a position of national interest and institutional strength. Cameroon must ultimately determine what that means for itself.

Paul Biya Is Not the Whole Problem This is why blaming Paul Biya alone is insufficient.

Biya has become the symbol of Cameroon’s political stagnation because he has occupied the presidency for more than four decades. But replacing one man does not necessarily transform a political architecture. If the institutions remain unchanged, if the economic relationships remain unchanged, if the political culture remains unchanged, if foreign dependency remains unchanged, if public accountability remains weak, and if citizens remain excluded from genuine control of their national future, then a new president may simply inherit the caretaker’s office. The problem is therefore not only the person sitting in Etoudi. It is the structure surrounding the chair.

What Should La République du Cameroun Do?

Southern Cameroonians should not dictate to citizens of La République du Cameroun how they should organize their country. They must make that decision themselves. If they wish to maintain close relations with France, that is their sovereign choice. If they wish to renegotiate those relationships, that too is their responsibility. If they wish to deepen relationships with the United States, China, Russia, Britain, or any other country, they should do so according to their national interests. But those decisions should belong meaningfully to Cameroonians. That is what sovereignty requires.

Southern Cameroonians are similarly entitled to ask what political future best protects their own history, identity, institutions, rights, resources, and aspirations. One people does not need to deny the sovereignty of another in order to claim its own.

Conclusion: The Real Question After Biya

Paul Biya’s long presidency should teach Cameroonians one fundamental lesson. The most important political question is not simply: Who will replace Paul Biya? The deeper question is: What will replace the system he has spent four decades preserving? If Cameroon changes its president without examining its political architecture, economic dependency, institutional weakness, foreign relationships, and accountability systems, little may fundamentally change. The country could simply move from one caretaker to another.

La République du Cameroun must decide for itself what genuine sovereignty means. Southern Cameroonians must determine their own political future. Rather than treating those aspirations as mutually destructive, both peoples should confront the deeper question of whether the political structures inherited from colonialism have truly delivered the sovereignty promised at independence. Formal independence occurred in 1960. But independence is not completed by a date. It is completed when a people possess the institutions, economic capacity, political freedom, and strategic confidence to determine their own future.

That is why the unfinished question facing Cameroon is larger than Paul Biya. It is larger than France. It is larger than the next election. It is the question that every postcolonial society eventually has to answer: Who really governs—and in whose interests?

As Amazon associate this site earns from qualifying purchases

Its back to school, equip yourself from Amazon

https://www.amazon.com/s?k=back+to+school+equipments&crid=3GXUMB4TGGVEF&sprefix=back+to+school+equipments%2Caps%2C2229&linkCode=ll2&tag=njokings-20&linkId=e667fffdf69f4dcbae87b0b7bfa17c01&language=en_US&ref_=as_li_ss_tl

Uchiba Nelson, Contributor The Independentist News