HOW THE BIYA REGIME IS PLAYING THE SNAKE-AND-RATS GAME TO ELIMINATE AMBAZONIAN RESISTANCE AND ITS POLITICAL OPPONENTS; Divide, Isolate, Co-opt, and Destroy: The Politics of Survival in Yaoundé

The snake does not have to swallow all the rats at once. It only has to keep them divided until each becomes vulnerable. If Ambazonia and the wider Cameroonian opposition fail to understand this political reality, they risk spending their strength fighting one another while the system they seek to challenge continues to survive.

By Ali Dan Ismael
Editor-in-Chief, The Independentist News

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YAOUNDE – 26 October 2026 – There is an old lesson about the relationship between a snake and rats. A snake does not necessarily attack an entire colony at once. It waits, observes, isolates its prey, and strikes when the opportunity presents itself. Meanwhile, the rats may be so occupied with their individual survival, rivalries, and competition that they fail to recognise the danger threatening them collectively.

This metaphor offers a revealing perspective on the political survival strategy of Paul Biya’s regime in La République du Cameroun (LRC). For more than four decades, Biya has presided over a political system characterised by centralised authority, political patronage, restrictions on opposition activities, and periodic repression. His government has survived successive political challenges, electoral controversies, and growing demands for democratic accountability.

Nowhere has the human cost been more devastating than in the former British Southern Cameroons, where nearly a decade of armed conflict has left communities displaced, livelihoods destroyed, and the fundamental question of Ambazonian self-determination unresolved.

The disturbing question is whether Yaoundé has developed a method of weakening its opponents by encouraging fragmentation, exploiting their divisions, applying selective repression, and presenting political surrender as reconciliation. The snake does not need to destroy every rat simultaneously. It only needs to prevent them from acting together.

DIVIDE THE OPPOSITION BEFORE CONFRONTING IT

One of the oldest methods of political domination is to divide those who challenge established power. A united opposition can confront a government with coherent demands. A fragmented opposition becomes preoccupied with leadership disputes, competing loyalties, and internal accusations.

Within the Ambazonian independence movement, disagreements over political representation, leadership legitimacy, negotiating authority, and strategic direction have undermined collective effectiveness.

Not every disagreement can reasonably be attributed to the Biya regime. Personal ambitions, organisational weaknesses, ideological differences, and leadership failures have contributed to these divisions. But Yaoundé benefits from the fragmentation.

When Ambazonian leaders spend more time challenging one another than developing a coordinated diplomatic strategy, the existing political order gains an advantage. When organisations compete for recognition without establishing a credible common political platform, international engagement becomes more difficult.

And when supporters begin treating fellow independence advocates as greater enemies than the government they oppose, the struggle risks becoming trapped in permanent internal conflict. This is the first principle of the snake-and-rats game: an opponent weakened from within becomes easier to neutralise from outside.

MILITARY PRESSURE AND THE POLITICS OF EXHAUSTION

Since the crisis escalated in 2016, the population of the former British Southern Cameroons has endured tremendous suffering.

Killings, displacement, economic destruction, school disruptions, arbitrary detention, and allegations of serious human rights violations have become defining features of the conflict. International organisations have documented abuses by government forces and armed separatist groups alike.

The resulting humanitarian catastrophe has created conditions in which ordinary families increasingly prioritise immediate survival. Parents want their children back in school. Farmers want access to their land. Traders want safe roads. Displaced families want to return home. These are legitimate human aspirations. Yet prolonged suffering creates political vulnerability.

A population exhausted by war may become increasingly receptive to almost any initiative promising an end to insecurity, even when that initiative leaves the fundamental political dispute unresolved. This distinction matters. A demand for peace is not necessarily a rejection of self-determination.

A desire for functioning schools does not imply acceptance of the existing constitutional arrangement. And a population’s exhaustion should never be interpreted automatically as political consent. The danger arises when humanitarian desperation becomes a substitute for meaningful political negotiation.

DION NGUTE’S COMMUNITY DIALOGUE: PEACE INITIATIVE OR POLITICAL DIVERSION?

The latest community dialogue initiative provides a revealing example of the political questions surrounding Yaoundé’s approach to the Ambazonian conflict. On September 28, 2026, colonial Prime Minister Joseph Dion Ngute launched a community dialogue initiative in Buea. On October 15, he extended the initiative to Bamenda, calling for peace and collective participation in ending the conflict.

The government presents these meetings as opportunities to restore stability, promote reconciliation, and address local concerns. But the central question remains unanswered. How can community dialogue resolve a political dispute over sovereignty if the parties are not permitted to examine the underlying question of sovereignty itself?

The Ambazonian conflict did not originate as a dispute between Nso and Bali, Manyu and Meme, or Fako and Ngoketunjia. Its contemporary escalation emerged from grievances concerning the political, legal, educational, and institutional relationship between the former British Southern Cameroons and LRC.

The subsequent independence movement transformed those grievances into an explicit demand for self-determination. Reducing this dispute to disagreements among communities risks changing the subject without resolving the problem.

Road repairs, school reconstruction, public services, and economic recovery are urgently needed. But they cannot independently settle a dispute concerning political authority. This is why the community dialogue framework deserves close scrutiny.

The question is not whether dialogue is desirable. The question is whether the dialogue addresses the actual parties, the actual grievances, and the fundamental political issue. A process that excludes the core dispute may provide political publicity while leaving the conflict intact.

THE FON OF NSO AND THE DOULA CONTROVERSY

The reported community dialogue involving the Fon of Nso in Douala on October 24, 2026, introduces another troubling dimension. According to public announcements, the initiative was presented as an effort to promote peace amid the continuing Anglophone conflict. No responsible person should object to genuine efforts to stop civilian suffering.

However, the circumstances raise legitimate questions concerning traditional leadership, territorial responsibility, and political representation. The Fon of Nso derives his traditional legitimacy from the Nso people, their ancestral institutions, and the customary responsibilities associated with his throne.

His authority is not equivalent to a national political mandate to determine the constitutional future of the former British Southern Cameroons. Moreover, the location of the dialogue is politically significant. Holding a purported community reconciliation process in Douala, outside the ancestral homeland whose inhabitants continue to experience the consequences of war, raises questions about representation and accountability.

A traditional ruler may have understandable security reasons for residing outside his territory. Such circumstances must be acknowledged. Nevertheless, distance from the affected population creates an obligation to demonstrate how its views are being represented.

Why was Douala selected? Who authorised the participants to speak for the affected communities? Were those bearing the greatest consequences of the conflict meaningfully consulted? What proposals emerged concerning the historical and political dispute? And how does this initiative relate to the wider community dialogue programme promoted by the Biya government?

These questions require transparent answers. The available public reports establish that the initiatives occurred within the same political period. They do not, by themselves, establish that the Fon’s initiative was directed or secretly coordinated by Yaoundé. Nevertheless, the political danger remains. Traditional authority must not become a substitute for political representation.

A Fon may legitimately promote peace among his people. But his ancestral responsibility does not automatically authorise him to negotiate away the political aspirations of other communities. Peacebuilding and political settlement are related, but they are not interchangeable.

CO-OPTATION: WHEN INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS REPLACE COLLECTIVE RIGHTS

The Biya political system has long relied on appointments, patronage, and the distribution of state-controlled opportunities. Such arrangements can create incentives for political accommodation. A politician may receive an appointment. A traditional ruler may receive official recognition. An influential personality may gain access to government institutions.

These developments do not necessarily establish improper motives. Individuals may sincerely believe that engagement with the government is the best path toward peace. But the danger emerges when personal political accommodation is presented as collective reconciliation. One appointment cannot resolve a sovereignty dispute. One traditional ruler cannot speak for every Ambazonian community. One faction cannot surrender the political claims of an entire population.

And one ceremonial meeting cannot replace credible negotiations involving parties capable of making and implementing binding commitments. This is how co-optation can become politically effective: individual recognition is substituted for collective political resolution.

THE SAME SNAKE, DIFFERENT OPPONENTS

The pattern is not confined to Ambazonia. Across LRC, political opponents have encountered restrictions on their activities, arbitrary detention, electoral exclusion, and coercive responses to demonstrations.

Maurice Kamto and the Cameroon Renaissance Movement have faced significant political and legal obstacles. The disputed October 2025 presidential election was followed by protests and a crackdown that drew international criticism. These developments illustrate a wider challenge facing political opposition under Biya.

Ambazonian independence advocates and Cameroonian opposition parties do not necessarily pursue the same political destination. The former seek self-determination and independence. Many of the latter seek democratic reform or political alternation within Cameroon. Their constitutional objectives are fundamentally different.

Yet both have an interest in defending the rule of law, political freedoms, accountable government, and protection against arbitrary state power. An authoritarian political system benefits when these different opponents become too divided to defend even their common civil liberties. This is another dimension of the snake-and-rats game. Opponents need not agree on their final political objectives to recognise the danger of arbitrary repression.

THE MOST DANGEROUS FORM OF ELIMINATION

Political elimination does not always require physical destruction. An opposition leader can remain alive but imprisoned. A political party can remain registered but unable to compete effectively. A liberation movement can retain its name and symbols while losing institutional coherence. A traditional institution can continue to exist while becoming increasingly dependent on government recognition. An electorate can continue participating in elections without possessing meaningful opportunities to change the governing order.

In each instance, the outward appearance of political life survives while its practical effectiveness diminishes. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that every government action belongs to a single coordinated programme to physically eliminate all opponents. But the broader pattern of repression, political exclusion, patronage, and institutional fragmentation deserves serious examination. The central question is whether these mechanisms, operating together, allow the Biya regime to preserve power by systematically weakening the forces capable of challenging it.

AMBAZONIA MUST NOT CONFUSE UNITY WITH UNQUESTIONING LOYALTY

The solution to political fragmentation is not blind loyalty to individual leaders. Ambazonia needs accountable institutions, transparent leadership, credible political representation, and the ability to resolve internal disagreements without destroying collective effectiveness. Unity must be built around agreed principles rather than personalities.

Political organisations should be able to disagree over strategies while recognising shared humanitarian responsibilities. Leaders should be held accountable for the use of resources, the accuracy of public claims, and the consequences of their decisions. Traditional rulers should preserve their customary legitimacy without presenting themselves as substitutes for representative political institutions.

And advocates of self-determination must ensure that their movement protects the civilians whose rights it claims to defend. A liberation struggle that loses its moral discipline risks weakening its own political legitimacy.

CONCLUSION: THE SNAKE WINS WHEN THE RATS TURN AGAINST ONE ANOTHER

The events of October 2026 should encourage serious reflection. Dion Ngute’s community dialogue initiatives and the Fon of Nso’s reported meeting in Douala raise important questions about how the Ambazonian conflict is being politically framed. Is the objective to address the underlying sovereignty dispute, or to manage its consequences while leaving the central issue untouched?

Are the affected populations being represented, or are selected personalities being presented as their representatives? Is dialogue becoming a credible pathway to political settlement, or another means of containing opposition without addressing its fundamental demands? These questions cannot be answered through ceremonial declarations of peace alone.

They require transparency, genuine representation, and a willingness to confront the political issues that gave rise to the conflict. For Ambazonia, the danger of prolonged internal division is equally serious. A movement fragmented by leadership rivalries, accusations, and competing political structures becomes more vulnerable to external pressure.

The Biya regime does not need every Ambazonian leader to abandon the struggle. It benefits whenever those leaders become incapable of acting collectively. It does not need every opposition politician to support the ruling party. It benefits when opposition forces cannot translate public dissatisfaction into effective institutional change. The enduring lesson is unmistakable:

The snake does not have to swallow all the rats at once. It only has to keep them divided until each becomes vulnerable. If Ambazonia and the wider Cameroonian opposition fail to understand this political reality, they risk spending their strength fighting one another while the system they seek to challenge continues to survive.

The greatest victory for an entrenched regime is not necessarily the destruction of every opponent. It is the destruction of their collective capacity to challenge its power.

As Amazon associate this site earns from qualifying purchases

Buy your copies of books on the Ambazonian revolution by Martin Mungwa on Amazon

https://www.amazon.com/s?k=martin+mungwa&crid=12QJW2DNJ08H0&sprefix=martin+mungwa%2Caps%2C4332&linkCode=ll2&tag=njokings-20&linkId=1b5a34296dc1c02f4720b9fb22983f45&language=en_US&ref_=as_li_ss_tl

— Ali Dan Ismael
Editor-in-Chief, The Independentist News