Can Southern Cameroons–Ambazonia build a peaceful, democratic, productive and responsibly governed society capable of securing its own future while contributing to the stability and prosperity of Britain, the United States, Africa and the wider international community? If that proposition can be demonstrated rather than merely declared, the Southern Cameroons question enters a fundamentally different arena. It moves from grievance to proposition. From protest to diplomacy. From advocacy to statecraft. And that is why Chatham House matters.
By Martin S. Mungwa, PhD, Fellow ASCE contributor The Independentist News
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The Next Stage of the International Conversation
For Southern Cameroons–Ambazonia, the challenge is no longer simply to convince the world that a conflict exists. The world has heard about the killings, displacement, destruction of communities, political grievances and competing narratives surrounding the conflict. The more difficult challenge now is to move the Southern Cameroons question from the margins of international advocacy into the places where diplomats, governments, scholars, investors, security specialists and policy institutions examine whether political solutions are historically justified, practically achievable and strategically valuable. That is why Chatham House matters.
Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, cannot recognize Southern Cameroons–Ambazonia as an independent state. It cannot compel the Republic of Cameroon to negotiate, instruct the British government to change its foreign policy or determine the constitutional future of the people of Southern Cameroons. Nor should an invitation to Chatham House ever be represented as British recognition of Ambazonia. Its importance lies elsewhere. Chatham House occupies a respected space in international affairs where political arguments are subjected to research, debate, evidence and scrutiny by people whose ideas can influence governments and the broader policy community.
For Ambazonia, that is potentially more valuable than another sympathetic audience. Southern Cameroons does not need an international institution to manufacture its legitimacy. It needs serious international institutions willing to examine its case. If the historical, constitutional, political and economic arguments are strong, they should survive rigorous examination. If weaknesses exist, they should be exposed and corrected before they become weaknesses in diplomacy or governance.
The strategic question should therefore not be, “How can Chatham House support Ambazonia?” It should be: How can the Southern Cameroons–Ambazonia question become an unavoidable subject of serious international policy analysis? Southern Cameroons Has Already Entered the Chatham House Conversation
This would not be the first time Chatham House has considered the conflict. In 2017, it hosted a discussion on the Cameroon Anglophone Crisis that examined the colonial background, the 1961 political arrangements, the federal system, its subsequent abolition, political grievances and the emergence of calls for an independent Ambazonia.
That earlier engagement is important, but it must be understood correctly. It did not amount to a Chatham House endorsement of independence. Indeed, the principal position advanced during that discussion favored federation rather than separation. Chatham House itself did not adopt a position on either outcome.
The significance of that history is therefore not that Chatham House once supported Ambazonia. It did not. The significance is that Southern Cameroons has already entered the institution’s policy conversation. The opportunity now is to deepen that conversation beyond the familiar description of the conflict as simply an “Anglophone crisis.”
Language matters. The erosion of English-language educational and judicial institutions matters. Cultural and administrative marginalization matter. But the deeper Southern Cameroons argument reaches beyond language. It concerns the constitutional arrangements surrounding 1961, the position of Southern Cameroons as the smaller political partner, the disappearance of the federal structure in 1972, subsequent constitutional transformation, political consent, institutional identity and the meaning of self-government.
A serious international discussion should therefore ask whether this is merely a linguistic minority problem within an existing state, a failed federal compact, a constitutional rupture, a dispute over political consent and self-determination, or some combination of these.
The answer should not be imposed by slogans from either side. It should be tested against history, constitutional records, diplomatic archives, international law and the political consequences of what followed. A movement confident in its case should not fear the archive. It should open it.
Britain Cannot Be Separated from the Historical Question
The importance of Chatham House is especially significant because the conversation would take place in Britain. Chatham House is independent of the British government, but Britain cannot be removed from the history of Southern Cameroons. Britain administered the territory before the 1961 political transition, and any serious examination of how Southern Cameroons entered its subsequent political relationship with the Republic of Cameroun inevitably raises questions about Britain’s role.
The strongest argument is not that Britain should be blamed for every event that followed. That would simplify a complicated historical process and weaken the diplomatic case. The stronger approach is to ask questions that can be answered by documents.
What did British officials understand the 1961 political arrangement to mean? What protections were expected for Southern Cameroons as the smaller partner? What assumptions surrounded federation? What safeguards existed if the larger partner later dismantled the agreed constitutional architecture? What was Britain’s understanding when the federation disappeared in 1972? How did British policymakers interpret subsequent constitutional developments, and what responsibilities, if any, arise from that historical relationship today? These are questions for archives, scholarship and diplomacy rather than political slogans. They deserve rigorous examination.
The Argument Cannot Stop in 1961
Yet Southern Cameroons–Ambazonia will make a strategic mistake if it believes that history alone can carry the international case. Even if diplomats become convinced that a profound historical injustice occurred, they will immediately ask another question: what happens next? This is where the debate must move from grievance to governance.
The international community will eventually ask what happens the morning after a political settlement. Does the school open? Who pays the teachers? Who keeps the hospital operating? Who maintains the electricity network? Who runs the ports and airports? Who collects customs revenue? Who administers justice? Who regulates banking? Who manages public finance? Who protects property rights? Who maintains infrastructure? Who controls the security services? Who signs international agreements? Who protects minorities and political opponents? Who prevents the institutions of liberation from becoming the institutions of authoritarianism?
These are not administrative details to be considered after sovereignty has been achieved. They are the substance of sovereignty. A flag can represent sovereignty, but it cannot operate an electricity system. A declaration can announce political independence, but it cannot run a port. A liberation movement can mobilize people, but mobilization is not the same thing as governing. Liberation capacity is not governing capacity.
This is one of the central arguments that Southern Cameroons–Ambazonia must be prepared to carry into institutions such as Chatham House. The question is no longer only whether Ambazonians can explain why they seek independence. The question is whether they can demonstrate how freedom would be converted into functioning institutions. From Resource Wealth to Productive Sovereignty
The same maturity is required in the economic argument. Global competition in Africa increasingly concerns infrastructure, energy, ports, technology, strategic minerals, supply chains, food security, markets and access to growing populations. Southern Cameroons–Ambazonia must understand this changing environment and resist the temptation to present itself merely as another African territory rich in natural resources. Africa has heard that story before.
Possessing resources does not automatically create prosperity. Exporting resources does not necessarily produce development. Attracting foreign capital does not automatically create economic sovereignty. A country can possess extraordinary mineral and agricultural wealth while remaining poor because the productive value generated by those resources leaves faster than productive capacity is created at home.
The critical question is therefore not simply how much foreign capital enters Ambazonia. The question is what remains after the investment has been made and legitimate profits have been earned. Does the investment create skills? Does it transfer technology? Does it generate local processing? Does it build infrastructure? Does it create domestic companies? Does it expand employment? Does it broaden ownership? Does it develop management capability? Does the money circulate through the domestic economy and create another productive cycle, or does it disappear?
That is the difference between extraction and what I describe as productive sovereignty. Foreign investment should be welcomed. Investors must have the opportunity to earn legitimate returns. Capital, engineering, technology, management expertise and global markets can accelerate development. But major economic relationships should ultimately be judged by whether they leave the population more productive after the transaction than before it. Political sovereignty without productive sovereignty can become dependency under another flag.
The Strongest Ambazonian Argument Is Constructive, Not Vindictive
Serious diplomacy also requires a change in tone. The strongest case for Southern Cameroons–Ambazonia cannot be built primarily around hostility toward ordinary citizens of the Republic of Cameroon. The dispute is historical, constitutional and political. Whatever political settlement ultimately emerges, the people on both sides will remain neighbors.
They will trade with one another. Roads will cross political boundaries. Families will remain connected. Businesses will require markets. Rivers, power systems, security concerns and regional infrastructure will not obey political rhetoric.
A credible Southern Cameroons–Ambazonia should therefore be presented not as a future enemy of Cameroon but as a potential contributor to regional stability. A productive Ambazonia could strengthen Atlantic commerce, Gulf of Guinea security, cross-border trade with Nigeria, agriculture, energy development, transportation and regional investment.
The objective of political settlement should not be the humiliation of one population by another. It should be to create conditions under which ordinary people can live with greater security, dignity, freedom and opportunity. That is the language serious international audiences understand.
Ambazonia Must Be Prepared for Difficult Questions
Entering institutions such as Chatham House would also require Ambazonians to accept an uncomfortable but necessary principle. Southern Cameroons cannot demand rigorous international examination of Yaoundé while refusing rigorous examination of itself. The questions will be difficult.
Who legitimately speaks for Southern Cameroons? How will political authority be democratically authorized? How will minority communities be protected? How will political opposition be treated? How will armed formations be brought under lawful civilian control? How will public finances be audited? How will corruption be prevented? How will government contracts be awarded? How will investors be protected from arbitrary expropriation? How will relations with Nigeria be managed? How will future relations with the Republic of Cameroon be normalized? How will questions involving assets, debts, pensions, infrastructure, trade and borders be resolved?
And perhaps most importantly, how will Ambazonians ensure that a new political system does not reproduce the centralized and unaccountable practices they condemn today? These should not be regarded as hostile questions. They are statehood questions. The answer cannot simply be, “Trust us.” Trust must be earned through conduct.
Five Tests of Institutional Readiness
A serious Ambazonian proposition can be assessed through five tests: legitimacy, administration, protection, production and external relations.
Legitimacy asks whether political authority originates from the people and remains subject to law. Administration asks whether government can perform the ordinary functions required of a state. Protection asks whether civilians, minorities and political opponents can live safely under institutions committed to human rights. Production asks whether the economy can create food, energy, infrastructure, jobs, investment, knowledge and wealth. External relations ask whether the state can coexist responsibly with its neighbors and participate constructively in the international system.
These tests are important because international recognition alone cannot create a successful country. Africa already contains internationally recognized states whose people remain poorly served by their institutions. The ambition of Southern Cameroons–Ambazonia should therefore be larger than placing another flag on the African map. It should be to build a state worth belonging to.
What a Chatham House Conversation Should Look Like
A renewed Southern Cameroons discussion at Chatham House should therefore not resemble a political rally transported to London. Its value would come precisely from its seriousness. A suitable theme could be: Southern Cameroons–Ambazonia: From Protracted Conflict to a Credible Political Settlement.
Such a conversation should bring together historians capable of examining the trusteeship and constitutional record, international lawyers capable of testing competing legal arguments, conflict-resolution specialists capable of examining mediation, economists capable of considering viability, security specialists capable of analyzing civilian protection, infrastructure professionals capable of examining development requirements and representatives of competing political perspectives prepared to defend their positions using evidence.
The discussion should ask what exactly was contemplated in 1961, what political and constitutional arrangements followed, what protections existed for Southern Cameroons as the smaller partner, what changed in 1972, why subsequent political arrangements failed to resolve the dispute, and what settlement options remain credible today.
It should also ask whether the parties can enter dialogue without preconditions under a mutually acceptable mediator or facilitator and whether credible international guarantors might help ensure that any negotiated settlement is actually implemented. Most importantly, it should ask what political outcome can ultimately command legitimate democratic consent from the people whose future is being decided.
Such a discussion would not predetermine independence, federation, confederation or another constitutional arrangement. It would create a serious setting in which those alternatives could be examined rather than shouted across political barricades.
London and Washington Are Different Doors
Southern Cameroons–Ambazonia should also recognize that London and Washington represent different but complementary diplomatic opportunities. Washington naturally asks what Southern Cameroons means for American interests. The conversation therefore includes the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria, Atlantic access, maritime security, supply chains, technology, trade, private enterprise, democratic institutions and regional stability.
London carries many of those same contemporary interests, but Britain also has a historical relationship with Southern Cameroons that cannot be ignored. The British conversation may therefore begin partly with history. The American conversation may begin primarily with strategy. But both eventually arrive at the same question: can a peaceful, democratic, economically productive and institutionally credible Southern Cameroons–Ambazonia contribute to a more stable and prosperous region while becoming a responsible international partner? That is a far stronger proposition than asking either country to support Ambazonia purely out of sympathy. Nations pursue interests. Successful diplomacy identifies where interests overlap.
Chatham House Is a Door, Not a Destination
Chatham House should therefore never be mistaken for the destination of Ambazonian diplomacy. It is a door. Beyond that door lies a wider community of diplomats, governments, universities, international lawyers, investors, journalists, security experts, development institutions and policy thinkers who help determine which international questions receive serious attention. The importance of reaching such institutions is not prestige. It is scrutiny.
Southern Cameroons–Ambazonia should seek that scrutiny not by demanding sympathy but by presenting evidence; not by demanding that outsiders accept a predetermined conclusion but by inviting them to examine the proposition; not merely by describing what has been lost but by demonstrating what can be built. That is how a political struggle begins to mature into statecraft.
From Grievance to Proposition
The world already knows that Southern Cameroons is in conflict. It knows that people have suffered. It knows that competing narratives exist. It knows that the territory has a distinctive colonial and constitutional history. The next question is harder.
Can Southern Cameroons–Ambazonia demonstrate a credible pathway from conflict to political settlement, from political settlement to legitimate institutions and from legitimate institutions to security, production and shared prosperity? That is where the international argument must now go. Study the history. Open the archives. Examine 1961. Examine the federal structure. Examine 1972. Examine the constitutional changes that followed. Examine the human consequences of the conflict. Examine the competing legal and political claims. But do not stop there.
Examine the electricity network and the ports. Examine the airports and roads. Examine public finance, agriculture, healthcare and education. Examine security and the rule of law. Examine natural resources and investment. Examine human capital, regional commerce and democratic institutions. Examine what will still have to function after the speeches end, the celebrations fade and ordinary citizens wake up the following morning expecting their country to work.
Then ask the question that ultimately matters: Can Southern Cameroons–Ambazonia build a peaceful, democratic, productive and responsibly governed society capable of securing its own future while contributing to the stability and prosperity of Britain, the United States, Africa and the wider international community? If that proposition can be demonstrated rather than merely declared, the Southern Cameroons question enters a fundamentally different arena. It moves from grievance to proposition. From protest to diplomacy. From advocacy to statecraft. And that is why Chatham House matters.
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Martin S. Mungwa, PhD, Fellow ASCE contributor The Independentist News
