The question is not whether Washington must recognize every movement claiming independence. It is whether American diplomacy should remain open to political arrangements capable of securing consent, accountability, stability, and mutually beneficial economic relationships.
By Martin S. Mungwa, Ph.D., Fellow ASCE, Contributor The Independentist News
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Washington – 8 October 2026 – In an October 8 commentary in the Washington Examiner, political scientist Peter Harris makes a compelling argument that Washington should reconsider its refusal to recognize Somaliland. His proposition is straightforward: American foreign policy should not defend inherited territorial arrangements automatically when a different political settlement might better advance regional stability, economic development, and U.S. strategic interests.
Israel’s December 2025 recognition of Somaliland has brought that question into sharper focus. But it raises another question deserving Washington’s attention: If the United States can reconsider Somaliland’s status in the Horn of Africa, why should it not examine the unresolved political future of the former British Southern Cameroons on the Gulf of Guinea?
The cases are not identical. Their histories, constitutional arrangements, political circumstances, and institutional capacities differ. Yet both challenge the assumption that territorial arrangements inherited from decolonization must remain beyond serious international examination, regardless of subsequent political developments. A Historical Question Washington Should Examine
Somaliland was briefly independent in June 1960 before uniting with the former Italian-administered Somalia. After the collapse of that union amid repression and civil war, Somaliland declared the restoration of its independence in 1991.
Southern Cameroons followed a different path. Administered by Britain under United Nations trusteeship, Southern Cameroons participated in the February 1961 plebiscite, which offered two alternatives: independence through joining Nigeria or independence through joining the Republic of Cameroun. Independence as a separate state was not presented as a third option. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1608 (XV) subsequently endorsed Southern Cameroons joining the Republic of Cameroun on October 1, 1961, and called for discussions to finalize the arrangements implementing that decision.
The controversy concerns what followed: the nature of the union, the constitutional transformations of 1972 and 1984, and the continuing disagreement over whether the political rights and institutional identity of Southern Cameroons were adequately protected. These questions deserve historical and legal scrutiny, not diplomatic dismissal.
The Gulf of Guinea Is America’s Other Strategic Maritime Frontier
Harris emphasizes Somaliland’s proximity to the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, a maritime corridor central to global trade and security. Southern Cameroons occupies a different but potentially important position along the Atlantic-facing Gulf of Guinea. Its coastal geography, proximity to Nigerian markets, agricultural potential, energy resources, and access to regional transport corridors present opportunities for economic integration and development.
For Washington, the broader Gulf of Guinea matters because of maritime security, energy transportation, commercial supply chains, piracy, illicit trafficking, and competition for economic influence.
The strategic question is not whether Southern Cameroons can simply become another Somaliland. It is whether a durable political settlement, supported by accountable institutions and productive economic development, could contribute to stability in an increasingly important African region. That possibility deserves careful examination.
Territorial Integrity Cannot Be the Entire Conversation
African governments have legitimate reasons to fear that recognition of new states could encourage destabilizing territorial disputes. Somalia has rejected Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, while the African Union has maintained its commitment to Somalia’s territorial integrity. These concerns cannot be dismissed. But neither should territorial integrity become a substitute for addressing genuine grievances concerning representation, constitutional governance, historical agreements, and political consent.
The International Court of Justice’s 2010 Kosovo advisory opinion established that general international law contains no applicable prohibition on declarations of independence. It did not, however, establish a universal entitlement to secession or diplomatic recognition. Every case therefore requires careful examination of its own circumstances.
For Southern Cameroons, the appropriate starting point is the historical record, including the 1961 plebiscite, the United Nations resolutions, the terms of the political union, subsequent constitutional developments, and the consequences of the present conflict. A credible diplomatic process must also account for the views of affected populations, civilian protection, and the feasibility of competing political settlements.
Recognition Must Be Matched by Responsibility
Somaliland’s strongest argument is not geography alone. Its supporters point to decades of functioning institutions and a demonstrated capacity for self-government. This presents an important lesson for the Southern Cameroons independence movement. International recognition cannot rest exclusively on historical grievances, however compelling. It must also address the practical questions foreign governments are entitled to ask.
Who represents the people? How would democratic legitimacy be established? How would institutions protect minorities and political dissent? What arrangements would guarantee security, responsible economic management, and peaceful relations with neighboring countries? These questions do not weaken the argument for self-determination. They are essential to demonstrating that any proposed political future can be sustainable.
A people-centered political project should therefore place democratic accountability, civilian protection, productive institutions, and constitutional safeguards at the center of its international case.
A Practical Opening for Washington
The Trump administration need not prejudge Southern Cameroons’ ultimate political status to recognize that the conflict deserves renewed attention. Washington could begin with a serious review of the territory’s historical and legal record, expanded engagement with credible representatives of affected communities, and an assessment of political settlement options consistent with international law.
It could also evaluate how peace, infrastructure development, regional commerce, and democratic governance might contribute to American interests in West-Central Africa. None of these steps requires immediate diplomatic recognition. All would represent a more substantive approach than treating the conflict solely as an internal security matter.
Harris is right to insist that American foreign policy consider the strategic consequences of Somaliland’s unresolved status. The same standard of serious examination should be available to Southern Cameroons. The question is not whether Washington must recognize every movement claiming independence. It is whether American diplomacy should remain open to political arrangements capable of securing consent, accountability, stability, and mutually beneficial economic relationships.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland does not settle the Southern Cameroons question. But it demonstrates that diplomatic assumptions once considered immovable can be reconsidered. Washington should examine the evidence, listen to the affected people, and assess the available alternatives. If strategic realism can reopen the conversation about Somaliland, it can at least justify an honest examination of Southern Cameroons.
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Martin S. Mungwa, Ph.D., Fellow ASCE, Contributor The Independentist News
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