State Firm SNH and Presidency Back Rival Refinery and Storage Projects, as Overcapacity Looms: Why the Oil Power Struggle in Yaoundé Should Concern Every Ambazonian

For Ambazonians, the central question is simple: Will Victoria remain a serious center of petroleum refining and maritime industry, or will its strategic economic functions be transferred elsewhere while Ambazonia is left with the ruins, risks, and memories of what it once hosted?

By Ali Dan Ismael
Editor-in-chief The Independentist News

A new struggle over petroleum infrastructure is unfolding at the highest levels of power in La République du Cameroun. It is being presented publicly as a debate about refineries, storage depots, fuel security, and industrial development. But beneath the technical language lies a larger question: who controls the petroleum economy, who receives the contracts, who assumes the debt, and which regions are permitted to become centers of national economic power?

On July 15, 2026, Africa Intelligence reported that two competing refinery and petroleum-storage projects, each involving several million dollars, were being promoted by rival centers of influence. One project is associated with Nathalie Moudiki and the Société Nationale des Hydrocarbures, or SNH. The other is supported through the presidency by Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh, Secretary-General at the Presidency. The publication warned that the projects are moving forward as the danger of excessive refining and storage capacity becomes increasingly apparent.

To the ordinary citizen, this may appear to be another distant quarrel among powerful officials in Yaoundé. It is not. For Ambazonians, the dispute raises urgent questions about SONARA in Victoria, the ownership of national petroleum infrastructure, the concentration of investment at Kribi, the use of public money, and the systematic exclusion of the people whose territory has hosted one of the most important industrial assets in the country.

The emerging conflict is not simply about how much fuel La République du Cameroun can refine or store. It is about who will control the machinery through which petroleum becomes political power.

Two Projects Competing for the Same Petroleum Future

The first project is the CSTAR refinery and storage complex at Kribi. CSTAR—Cameroon Secured Tank Farm and Refinery—was established through an arrangement involving SNH, TRADEX, and Ariana Energy. Nathalie Moudiki became chairwoman and chief executive of the project company, while Adolphe Moudiki remains the official Executive General Manager of SNH. Official SNH information identifies Nathalie Moudiki as the leader of CSTAR and a central figure in the construction of the new refinery and storage depot.

The CSTAR project is designed to include a modular refinery capable of processing approximately 30,000 barrels of crude oil per day. Its associated storage facility is expected to hold between 250,000 and 300,000 cubic metres of petroleum products. Construction was formally launched at Kribi in July 2025.

Publicly reported cost estimates have varied significantly. Some reports have placed the refinery and terminal component at approximately CFA115 billion, while other reporting has placed the larger CSTAR investment at approximately CFA372 billion. SNH reportedly arranged CFA120 billion—roughly $210 million to $215 million—through BGFIBank for its participation. The wide variation in published figures is itself a reason for greater public disclosure regarding the project’s scope, financing structure, shareholders, guarantees, contractors, and repayment obligations.

The second initiative is the Kribi Hydrocarbons Terminal promoted by the Société Camerounaise des Dépôts Pétroliers, or SCDP, in cooperation with the Port Authority of Kribi. The project received presidential approval for financing, communicated through Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh in May 2026.

According to SCDP, the first phase will provide 140,000 cubic metres of storage for liquid petroleum products and 12,000 metric tonnes for liquefied petroleum gas. The LPG component could eventually rise to 30,000 metric tonnes. The terminal is also being designed to handle five million tonnes of petroleum products annually at the beginning, potentially increasing to ten million tonnes.

The two projects are not identical. CSTAR combines refining with extensive storage, while the SCDP initiative is principally a large import, storage, distribution, and regional-transshipment terminal. Nevertheless, they are competing for financing, institutional authority, customers, strategic relevance, and access to the same emerging petroleum hub at Kribi. That is why the confrontation matters.

A country guided by a coherent national energy strategy should be able to demonstrate how the projects complement one another. Instead, current reporting suggests that they have become instruments of rivalry between powerful networks operating around SNH and the presidency.

The Missing Institution in the Debate: SONARA in Victoria

There is a third institution whose future must not be forgotten: the National Refining Company, SONARA, located in Victoria. Before the catastrophic fire of May 31, 2019, SONARA was the country’s principal refinery. Its theoretical refining capacity was approximately 2.1 million tonnes per year, generally reported as roughly 42,000 barrels per day. The refinery has remained out of production since the fire.

A reconstruction and modernization program is now intended to restore production by approximately December 2027. Public statements indicate that the initial objective is to recover refining capacity and adapt the installation more effectively to the heavier crude oils produced within the country.

This produces an obvious strategic question. What happens when SONARA’s capacity of approximately 42,000 barrels per day is restored while the new Kribi refinery is moving toward a capacity of another 30,000 barrels per day?

The combined theoretical capacity would be approximately 72,000 barrels per day. Meanwhile, the initial 10,000-barrel-per-day phase of the Kribi refinery has been described as capable of satisfying roughly 22 percent of national diesel and petrol requirements. That comparison supports the warning that, once both refineries are fully operational, total capacity may exceed immediate domestic demand unless there is a credible and competitive regional export strategy.

This does not automatically mean that additional capacity is unnecessary. Refineries require maintenance. Demand can grow. Strategic reserves are valuable. Regional markets can be developed. Imports can be displaced. A country should not rely indefinitely on foreign refineries for essential fuel. But capacity should be built according to transparent economic planning—not according to competition between political factions.

Ambazonians must therefore ask whether SONARA is being restored as a genuinely strategic national refinery or merely kept alive while the center of petroleum investment, storage, financing, and decision-making is permanently transferred from Victoria to Kribi.

Victoria Built the Industry; Kribi Receives the Future

SONARA has operated in Ambazonian territory for decades. It has benefited from Victoria’s coastline, land, labor, infrastructure, and strategic maritime location. Its presence has also exposed the surrounding population to industrial and environmental risk. Yet control over the refinery, the petroleum revenues associated with it, the financing of its reconstruction, and the broader direction of national energy policy have remained concentrated in Yaoundé.

Now, while Victoria and the wider Ambazonian territory endure war, displacement, deteriorating infrastructure, unemployment, and economic disruption, enormous new petroleum investments are being directed toward Kribi.

Ambazonians should not oppose development in Kribi merely because it is outside Ambazonia. That would reproduce the same narrow regionalism that has damaged the entire country. The issue is not that Kribi is receiving infrastructure. The issue is whether Victoria is being deliberately displaced from its historic role without public debate, economic compensation, regional consultation, or a transparent plan for the future of SONARA.

When SONARA was functioning, it was treated as a national asset. When it burned, the environmental, economic, and social consequences were borne heavily by Victoria. As new petroleum infrastructure is created elsewhere, Ambazonians are entitled to ask whether the most profitable parts of the industry are being relocated while the risks, debts, damaged land, and uncertain future remain in Ambazonia.

Energy Security or Elite Competition?

There are valid economic arguments for expanding petroleum-storage capacity. Since SONARA ceased production in 2019, La République du Cameroun has depended heavily on imported refined products. Inadequate port and storage infrastructure has contributed to delays and demurrage costs. SCDP officials have previously stated that the country has incurred billions of CFA francs in annual charges because petroleum vessels remained offshore beyond permitted unloading periods.

A modern deep-water petroleum terminal could reduce these costs, improve national reserves, enable larger ships to unload directly, and support distribution to landlocked Central African markets. The government may also reasonably seek to reduce its dependence on imported fuel, particularly following supply disruptions and international price volatility.

Furthermore, Nigeria’s Dangote refinery has already begun supplying petroleum products to Cameroon. This creates both opportunity and competition. Regional integration may provide cheaper and more reliable fuel, but it also means that smaller refineries must operate efficiently if they are to survive alongside a 650,000-barrel-per-day facility in Nigeria. The problem, therefore, is not investment itself. The problem is investment without visible coordination.

If CSTAR, the SCDP terminal, and SONARA are all components of one integrated energy strategy, the government should publish that strategy. It should explain the expected domestic demand, regional export market, supply sources, operating costs, projected margins, transportation system, storage requirements, environmental safeguards, and division of responsibilities.

Without such information, the public is left to conclude that these are not coordinated national projects but competing centers of capital accumulation. When public institutions sponsor rival infrastructure instead of implementing a unified national plan, the risk is that taxpayers will finance duplication while politically connected networks capture the contracts and revenues.

The Questions the Public Must Ask

The citizens financing these projects deserve more than ceremonial foundation stones and declarations of “energy sovereignty.” They deserve answers.

What is the complete cost of each project? Which public institutions are borrowing the money? Has the national treasury guaranteed any of the loans? Who are the ultimate shareholders of CSTAR and its associated companies? How were the technical, engineering, procurement, and construction partners selected? What feasibility studies demonstrate that two refineries and multiple large storage terminals can operate profitably? What assumptions have been made about future fuel consumption? Which countries have committed to purchase surplus production? Will SONARA receive crude oil on equal commercial terms, or will priority be given to Kribi? How will refinery capacity be divided between domestic consumption and exports? What will happen if international fuel prices make imported petroleum cheaper than locally refined products? What environmental liabilities will be imposed on Victoria and Kribi? Who will carry the debt if the projects fail? These are not questions against development. They are the minimum questions required to protect development from becoming extraction.

What the Struggle Reveals About the Regime

The reported confrontation between the SNH network and the presidency illustrates a deeper weakness within La République du Cameroun.

National institutions have increasingly become associated with personalities rather than constitutional responsibilities. Major projects are interpreted according to which official sponsors them, which faction finances them, and which network expects to control their revenues.

When a petroleum project is identified as “Nathalie Moudiki’s project” and another as “Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh’s project,” the problem is already visible. Public infrastructure should belong to the public. It should not belong to a presidential faction. It should not belong to a family. It should not belong to a secretary-general. It should not belong to an unelected circle operating around state companies.

A refinery should emerge from a national energy plan approved through accountable institutions. It should be evaluated by professional engineers, economists, environmental specialists, financial analysts, and representatives of the communities most directly affected. It should not become a battlefield in the succession politics of an aging regime.

Why Ambazonians Must Pay Attention

Ambazonians must study this development for at least five reasons. First, SONARA is located in Ambazonian territory. Decisions that weaken or marginalize it directly affect employment, industrial development, land use, environmental safety, and the future economic position of Victoria.

Second, petroleum infrastructure creates long-term political power. Refineries, depots, pipelines, ports, contracts, and distribution systems determine who controls the movement and value of energy. A territory that loses control of these systems can remain economically dependent even when resources are extracted from its land or waters.

Third, major loans contracted today may become contested obligations tomorrow. Ambazonia must carefully distinguish legitimate public liabilities from opaque debts incurred without the consent, benefit, or participation of its people.

Fourth, the movement of petroleum investment toward Kribi may permanently restructure the coastal economy before the Southern Cameroons conflict is resolved. By the time a political settlement is reached, the most profitable portions of the downstream petroleum industry may already have been relocated and consolidated elsewhere.

Fifth, the rivalry provides a lesson for the future. An independent Ambazonia cannot afford to reproduce the same personalized and opaque management of strategic assets. SONARA, petroleum storage, offshore resources, ports, pipelines, and fuel distribution must be governed through law, transparent ownership structures, independent audits, environmental regulation, and professional management.

The Ambazonian Position Should Not Be Opposition to Development

The Ambazonian response should not be to demand that Kribi remain undeveloped. It should be to demand justice, disclosure, accountability, and protection of Ambazonia’s strategic assets.

A serious Ambazonian energy policy would recognize that regional cooperation is necessary. Victoria and Kribi could serve complementary roles. One could specialize in particular crude grades or petroleum products. Storage and refining capacity could be coordinated across the Gulf of Guinea. Pipelines and shipping systems could support both domestic and regional markets. But cooperation requires equality.

It cannot mean that Ambazonia provides territory, resources, labor, and environmental exposure while decisions, financing, and profits are controlled elsewhere.

It cannot mean rebuilding SONARA with public rhetoric while quietly ensuring that Kribi receives the newer technology, deeper financing, larger storage system, better maritime infrastructure, and stronger political support.

It cannot mean calling SONARA a national asset when money is needed, but treating it as an inconvenient regional relic when investments are allocated.

A Future Ambazonian Energy Doctrine

The controversy should encourage Ambazonians to begin developing a clear energy doctrine for the future. That doctrine should preserve SONARA as a strategic industrial asset while subjecting it to a complete technical, financial, and environmental review. Its future should be based on economic viability rather than political symbolism.

The doctrine should also examine whether SONARA should remain principally a fuel refinery or evolve into a broader refinery-petrochemical complex capable of producing higher-value products.

Strategic fuel reserves should be established in more than one location so that the country is not dependent on a single vulnerable facility. Petroleum revenues should be independently audited and paid into transparent public accounts.

Environmental liabilities from refinery operations should be fully funded. Local communities should receive enforceable benefits, including employment, technical education, infrastructure, healthcare, and environmental protection.

Private participation should be welcomed, but ownership structures must be publicly disclosed. Most importantly, energy policy should be integrated with the transition toward natural gas, hydropower, solar energy, electric transportation, and industrial development. Oil infrastructure must serve economic transformation rather than become another arena for elite enrichment.

The Real Danger Is Not Too Much Infrastructure

The deeper danger is not simply that La République du Cameroun may build more refining or storage capacity than it immediately requires. The danger is that billions may be committed without a transparent national market analysis. The danger is that rival political networks may build overlapping projects using public authority and public borrowing. The danger is that SONARA may be gradually marginalized while Ambazonians are distracted by conflict and humanitarian survival. The danger is that future generations may inherit underperforming facilities, hidden debts, environmental liabilities, and contracts they never approved. The danger is that petroleum will continue to strengthen the state while weakening the people from whose territory much of that power has historically been projected.

Conclusion: This Is More Than a Yaoundé Power Struggle

The confrontation between the SNH-backed CSTAR project and the presidency-supported SCDP terminal is not an obscure dispute among petroleum technocrats.

It is a window into the internal structure of power in La République du Cameroun. It shows how strategic national infrastructure can become attached to personalities and competing political networks. It raises serious concerns about duplication, overcapacity, public debt, project governance, and the future of SONARA.

For Ambazonians, the central question is simple: Will Victoria remain a serious center of petroleum refining and maritime industry, or will its strategic economic functions be transferred elsewhere while Ambazonia is left with the ruins, risks, and memories of what it once hosted?

The answer cannot be left to Nathalie Moudiki. It cannot be left to Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh. It cannot be left to secret meetings, presidential instructions, offshore corporate arrangements, or competing factions within an unaccountable regime.

The petroleum economy belongs to the people. Its infrastructure must be planned for the public good. Its debts must be disclosed. Its contracts must be examined. Its environmental risks must be controlled. Its revenues must build prosperity rather than political dynasties.

Ambazonians must understand what is taking place. The struggle is not merely over two petroleum projects at Kribi. It is over the future geography of economic power. And once that geography has been constructed, it may be extremely difficult to reverse.

Ali Dan Ismael
Editor-in-chief The Independentist News