The question for Southern Cameroons is therefore no longer only: What caused the crisis? It is also: What systems has the crisis created? Who pays for those systems? Who benefits from them? Who controls them? And what must be dismantled economically, politically, and institutionally for peace to become more valuable than continued conflict? That is the deeper significance of the Nfor Martin Tombi report. Peace will require more than stopping gunfire.
By Dr. Martin S. Mungwa, Ph.D., F. ASCE Contributor The Independentist News.
Analysis based on the report of Maître Nfor Martin Tombi, A Sworn Crime Expert, Cameroon National Council of Crime Experts
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The most important contribution of the expert report is not simply its description of suffering. That part of the Southern Cameroons crisis is already widely understood. Its more important contribution is that it invites a different question: what kind of economy has grown around the conflict, who bears its costs, who extracts value from it, and what incentives has prolonged violence created?
That question matters because a conflict that lasts for nearly a decade cannot be understood only through constitutional claims, military operations, diplomatic statements, or casualty figures. Prolonged conflict reorganizes economic life. It changes who can move, who can trade, who can tax, who can extort, who can acquire distressed property, who controls transport corridors, who receives external funding, and who gains political relevance from continued instability.
The report therefore deserves serious attention. But it also deserves disciplined treatment. Some of its observations are readily understandable as consequences of war. Others are allegations or hypotheses that require independent evidence before they should be presented as established fact. The analytical task is not to dismiss the report because every claim has not yet been proven. Nor is it to repeat every assertion as fact. The task is to identify the mechanisms the report describes and ask what they reveal about the political economy of prolonged conflict.
The Conflict as an Economy
The report opens with a provocative proposition: the Anglophone crisis is “not one crisis, it is an economy.” That does not mean that the origins of the conflict were economic. The grievances that gave rise to the crisis include questions of language, law, education, political authority, constitutional arrangements, identity, governance, and the relationship between the former British Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon.
But once violence persists, another system begins to develop alongside the political dispute. Roadblocks acquire economic value. Checkpoints become places of extraction. Security becomes a commodity. Movement becomes something that can be permitted, denied, or monetized. Kidnapping can become an income stream. Diaspora fundraising can become institutionalized. Humanitarian access can become economically valuable. Abandoned land can become vulnerable to appropriation. Political actors can acquire prominence because they command armed men, represent constituencies, control information, or claim the ability to negotiate.
This does not mean that every actor involved in the conflict is motivated by money. That would be simplistic and unfair. It means that prolonged conflict creates economic incentives that did not exist at the beginning of the political dispute. Once those incentives become embedded, resolving the conflict becomes more difficult.
The First Mungwa Question: Who Pays?
The expert report gives a clear answer: the greatest burden falls upon people who possess the least power to determine the course of the conflict. The farmer who cannot reach his farm pays. The trader whose goods cannot move pays. The parent whose child loses years of education pays. The displaced family living in unfamiliar surroundings pays.
The young person who leaves school and finds neither employment nor security pays. The soldier sent into repeated operations pays. The armed young man who spends years in the bush and eventually discovers that there may be no easy route back into normal civilian life also pays. And the taxpayer pays because conflict diverts public resources from productive investment into security expenditure.
The importance of this observation is that war costs must not be measured only in military expenditure or deaths. The larger cost is the destruction of productive capacity. When a farmer misses one agricultural season, the loss is not simply that year’s harvest. Seed capital may disappear. Equipment deteriorates. Buyers find alternative suppliers. Children may leave school because household income collapses. Debt may accumulate. Land may become inaccessible. A previously viable family enterprise may cease to exist.
The same is true of education. A child who loses several years of schooling does not merely lose classroom time. The loss may affect literacy, technical capability, lifetime income, employability, confidence, social networks, and future entrepreneurial capacity.
This is why the report’s reference to a “lost generation” should not be dismissed as rhetoric. The precise scale requires evidence, but the economic mechanism is clear: prolonged educational disruption destroys future productive capacity.
Geography of Suffering
The report makes an important distinction between the location of suffering and the location of benefit. Its central proposition can be restated this way: The cost of the conflict is heavily concentrated geographically, while some of the economic and political benefits associated with the conflict may be collected far from the places where violence occurs. The farmer in Kumbo experiences the conflict physically. The mother in Mamfe experiences it through insecurity, food costs, transportation problems, education disruption, and family separation.
The child in Ndian experiences it through the condition of the school, the road, the household, and the surrounding community. Yet some financial flows associated with the conflict can move elsewhere—to urban centers, foreign countries, political organizations, armed intermediaries, commercial suppliers, social-media platforms, or diaspora networks. This creates an asymmetry. Those who pay the highest price may have the weakest ability to influence the decisions that determine whether confrontation continues. That asymmetry deserves far more attention in any serious peace process.
The War Economy
The report identifies several categories of people who may derive material benefit from continued conflict. The categories should be treated carefully because the existence of a mechanism does not establish the guilt of every person operating within that category. Nevertheless, the mechanisms themselves deserve investigation.
Kidnapping is the clearest example. Once ransom becomes predictable, organized, and repeatable, kidnapping ceases to be merely an act of violence. It becomes an economic activity. The victim becomes an asset. The family becomes the payer. The kidnappers become the collectors. Intermediaries may emerge. Information about who has money becomes valuable. Diaspora relatives may become sources of payment. The success of one ransom can finance another kidnapping. This is how criminal activity becomes self-reinforcing.
The report also points to informal taxation and checkpoint collections. Again, the analytical question is not merely whether one side or another operates checkpoints. The question is whether control over territory, roads, communities, or movement generates recurring revenue. If it does, then conflict produces a fiscal system outside normal public finance. That is significant because whoever controls collection possesses more than money. They acquire organizational power.
Revenue pays personnel. Revenue acquires equipment. Revenue rewards loyalty. Revenue finances communications. Revenue can strengthen command structures. Revenue can also create constituencies whose livelihoods begin to depend upon continued disorder.
Political Entrepreneurship
One of the report’s most sensitive claims concerns “political entrepreneurs.” This idea must be handled with precision. Political leadership during conflict is not inherently profiteering. Movements require organization, diplomacy, communications, fundraising, advocacy, administration, and political representation. The existence of those activities does not establish misconduct. The harder question is whether some individuals become more politically valuable because the crisis continues. That possibility exists in almost every prolonged conflict.
A person may acquire influence because he controls access to armed groups. Another may gain prominence because she controls diaspora fundraising. Another may become indispensable because governments, journalists, or diplomats regard him as a contact point. Another may build a media audience around constant conflict commentary. Another may derive status from being identified as the representative of a faction.
The analytical problem appears when political relevance becomes dependent upon the continuation of the condition that created the relevance. That does not prove that the individual deliberately prolongs the conflict. But it creates a potential incentive problem. This leads to a difficult but necessary question: If peace arrived tomorrow, which institutions, political positions, fundraising structures, media platforms, security arrangements, and personal networks would lose their present relevance? That question should be asked across all sides of the conflict.
The Diaspora Question
The report is appropriately careful to distinguish the broader diaspora from a small number of potential conflict entrepreneurs. That distinction is essential. The Southern Cameroonian diaspora has carried enormous family burdens. Diaspora households pay school fees, medical bills, rent, food costs, funeral expenses, relocation costs, and emergency support. Many families would face even greater hardship without remittances. Diaspora involvement should therefore not be portrayed collectively as profiteering.
The narrower question concerns accountability. Where money is raised explicitly for political, humanitarian, defense, or liberation purposes, basic governance questions follow: Who receives it? Who holds the account? Who authorizes expenditure? Who audits it? What percentage reaches the stated purpose? What assets are purchased? Who owns those assets? What happens to unused funds? Who reports to contributors? These questions are not hostile to a political cause. They are necessary for the integrity of any serious political movement. A liberation movement that demands transparency from a state should be capable of demonstrating transparency within its own financial structures.
Social Media and Conflict Monetization
The report’s reference to YouTube and Facebook raises a modern conflict-economy question that deserves careful treatment. Digital platforms have changed how conflicts are narrated and financed. Conflict generates attention. Attention generates views. Views can generate advertising revenue, donations, subscriptions, political influence, or fundraising.
Once an individual’s audience depends heavily on outrage, confrontation, battlefield information, accusations, and crisis escalation, there can be a structural incentive to produce more of the content that maintains attention. Again, this does not mean every commentator wants war. But the incentive exists. The correct response is not censorship. It is transparency.
Where political media channels solicit money, they should disclose the organizational purpose of the funds. Where individuals speak as journalists, activists, officials, fundraisers, or military advocates, audiences should be able to distinguish those roles. Information integrity becomes part of peacebuilding.
Humanitarian Assistance
The report alleges that some humanitarian assistance may be diverted and resold. This is a serious allegation and must not be generalized without evidence. But the underlying vulnerability is real enough to merit investigation. Humanitarian systems operating in conflict zones face difficult questions: Who identifies beneficiaries? Who controls access? Who transports supplies? Who controls warehouses? Who authorizes movement? Who provides security? Who verifies delivery? Who audits distribution?
Whenever scarce goods must pass through multiple intermediaries under insecure conditions, diversion is possible. The solution is not to discredit humanitarian organizations collectively. It is to insist on stronger traceability, independent verification, beneficiary feedback, and transparent procurement. Land, Property, and Distressed Assets
Perhaps the most consequential long-term issue raised by the report is property. War changes ownership indirectly even when no formal law changes. A family flees. A house remains empty. A farm is abandoned. A business closes. A property owner becomes desperate for money. Land that once had considerable productive value may be sold at a fraction of its previous price. Someone with cash and security can buy. Someone without either cannot wait. This produces what might be called conflict-driven asset transfer.
The report refers to land acquisition in and around Buea, Bamenda, Limbe, and other locations. Those specific claims should be documented carefully. But the broader mechanism deserves serious study.
If displacement leads systematically to distressed sales or irregular occupation, then the eventual peace settlement will inherit a property crisis. Who owns abandoned land? Were sales made voluntarily? Were titles valid? Were displaced owners coerced economically? Were records destroyed? Were properties occupied during absence? Can returning families recover their homes? A peace agreement that ignores property restitution can end armed confrontation while planting the seeds of another conflict.
The State Also Pays
The report correctly extends the cost beyond the North West and South West. Military operations require personnel, fuel, logistics, transport, equipment, intelligence, medical support, administration, and replacement of lost assets. Those costs are ultimately public costs. Every franc directed toward conflict is a franc unavailable for some alternative purpose.
That does not automatically mean every security expenditure is unnecessary. Governments have legitimate responsibilities to protect citizens, infrastructure, and public order. The analytical question is one of opportunity cost. What roads were not constructed? What hospitals were not upgraded? What schools were not equipped?What water systems were not completed? What electricity investments were delayed? What productive enterprises were never financed? The true cost of war is therefore not only what is spent. It is also what was never built.
The Youth Trap
The report is particularly important in identifying youth as victims on multiple sides. Young people can become trapped in conflict economies because the conflict itself destroys the alternatives to participation. Education deteriorates. Employment contracts. Mobility becomes dangerous. Businesses close. Agriculture becomes less reliable. Normal institutions weaken. At the same time, armed organizations, security structures, political networks, and informal economic systems may offer income, belonging, protection, identity, or purpose. This produces a dangerous feedback loop. Conflict destroys opportunity. The absence of opportunity increases recruitment. Recruitment strengthens conflict. Continued conflict destroys further opportunity. Breaking that cycle requires more than disarmament. It requires a credible productive alternative. Peace Must Therefore Be Economic as Well as Political
This is where the expert report becomes especially relevant to statecraft. Negotiations often focus on political arrangements: ceasefires, dialogue formats, constitutional structures, amnesty, decentralization, federalism, independence, demobilization, or international mediation. Those questions matter. But a durable settlement must also dismantle the economic structures created by prolonged conflict. If a person earns income from checkpoints, what replaces that income? If a young combatant surrenders a weapon, what productive pathway exists the following morning? If a kidnapping network loses its revenue stream, what prevents its members from becoming organized criminals?
If displaced families return, how will property disputes be resolved? If businesses have collapsed, where will working capital come from? If schools reopen, where are the teachers, materials, buildings, and traumatized children? If roads reconnect markets, who finances transport fleets? If agricultural production resumes, who buys the crops? Peace therefore requires the reconstruction of the productive economy. Without that, demobilization may simply relocate violence.
Who Has the Power to Stop the Conflict?
The report ends with perhaps its most important proposition: those who suffer most frequently possess the least ability to end the conflict. That observation should reshape the peace discussion. A farmer cannot declare a ceasefire. A displaced mother cannot order troops back to barracks. A schoolchild cannot suspend an armed campaign. A market trader cannot negotiate a political settlement.
The decisions that sustain or terminate conflict belong disproportionately to political authorities, armed actors, movement leadership, governments, international partners, and influential intermediaries. That creates a moral and political obligation.
Those possessing decision-making power should be judged not only by the justice of the positions they defend but also by the continuing human cost of failing to produce a workable political process. The Accountability Test Must Apply to Everyone The report becomes most valuable if its questions are applied symmetrically.
The government should be asked about the financial, security, political, and institutional incentives created by the conflict. Armed separatist organizations should be asked about taxation, kidnapping, civilian protection, funding, command structures, and accountability.
Diaspora organizations should be asked about fundraising and expenditure. Humanitarian organizations should be asked about delivery integrity. Traditional authorities should be asked about land and local governance. Businesses should be asked about contracts and conflict-related opportunities. International actors should be asked whether their policies reduce violence or merely manage it. No institution should be exempt simply because it claims the morally superior side of the conflict.
The Eight Questions That Should Now Be Asked
A serious investigation of the conflict economy should ask: Who pays? Who bears the financial, human, educational, and productive costs?
Who collects? Who receives taxes, ransoms, fees, donations, contracts, or other conflict-related revenues? Who signs? Who authorizes expenditures, operations, contracts, fundraising, and political commitments? Who supplies? Who provides weapons, transport, communications, logistics, fuel, information, and financial services? Who owns? Who acquires land, businesses, equipment, political platforms, or organizational assets during the crisis? Who controls the technology and information? Who controls communications, social-media narratives, databases, surveillance, and financial platforms? Who captures recurring value? Which actors receive continuing income specifically because the conflict persists? Who loses if peace succeeds? Which political, financial, institutional, or criminal arrangements would become less valuable if normal life returned? The eighth question may be the hardest. It may also be the most revealing.
What the Expert Report Does Not Yet Establish
The report should not be treated as a completed criminal investigation merely because its author is identified as a crime expert. Several propositions require documentary substantiation before they can responsibly be elevated from analytical claims to factual conclusions. Numbers concerning displacement should be dated and sourced. Claims concerning ransom levels should be supported by cases or datasets. Claims of humanitarian diversion should identify evidence.
Claims of land acquisition should be supported through property records or documented transactions. Claims concerning officials, traditional rulers, or political figures should be supported individually rather than generalized. Claims concerning diaspora fundraising should distinguish transparent organizations from those for which accounting problems can actually be demonstrated. This distinction protects both the credibility of the analysis and the reputations of people who should not be implicated without evidence.
The Larger Conclusion
The expert report points toward an uncomfortable truth. Prolonged conflict eventually creates structures that can survive beyond the original grievance. What began as a political dispute can acquire criminal markets. What began as emergency fundraising can become permanent fundraising. What began as temporary security arrangements can become institutionalized. What began as displacement can become permanent economic dispossession. What began as political leadership can become a career dependent upon unresolved conflict.
That does not mean the conflict continues simply because people profit from it. The causes are much deeper. But it does mean that the longer a conflict lasts, the more important it becomes to examine not only the grievances that started it, but the incentives that now sustain it.
The question for Southern Cameroons is therefore no longer only: What caused the crisis? It is also: What systems has the crisis created? Who pays for those systems? Who benefits from them? Who controls them? And what must be dismantled economically, politically, and institutionally for peace to become more valuable than continued conflict? That is the deeper significance of the Nfor Martin Tombi report. Peace will require more than stopping gunfire.
It will require making normal life, productive enterprise, accountable government, legitimate political participation, education, ownership, and lawful commerce more valuable than the economy that prolonged conflict has created. And that may be the most important test of all: Can Southern Cameroons move from an economy organized around conflict to an economy organized around human security, productive ownership, and peace?
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Dr. Martin S. Mungwa, Ph.D., F. ASCE Contributor The Independentist News.
