The Great Institutional Mirage: Why Nkwen and Bambili Bypassed Biya’s “House of Chiefs”

Communities did not require distant administrators to resolve boundary or land disputes. Local institutions carried legitimacy because they exercised real authority. Today’s structures, many argue, fail to replicate that level of autonomy.

By Timothy Engonene
Guest Editor-in-Chief, The Independentistnews

BAMENDA February 10, 2026 – The ongoing land dispute between the brotherly communities of Nkwen and Bambili has done more than create local tension. It has torn away the mask from Paul Biya’s so-called “Special Status” solution to the Anglophone crisis.

For years, Yaoundé has promoted the Regional Council and the Regional House of Chiefs as evidence of decentralization and respect for the political heritage of Southern Cameroons between 1954 and 1961. These institutions were marketed as the return of traditional authority and local governance.

But when a real crisis erupted in the Midland Zone, where did the affected communities go? They did not go to the House of Chiefs. They did not seek mediation from the Regional Council. Instead, they were redirected straight to the offices of the Governor and the Senior Divisional Officer (SDO), representatives of the same centralized administrative system imposed from Yaoundé. The illusion collapsed in real time.

The Grand Débat Smoke Screen

The creation of these institutions followed the much-publicized 2019 Grand National Dialogue, presented as a turning point in addressing Anglophone grievances. Citizens were told these reforms would restore local authority and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.

Yet the Nkwen-Bambili dispute demonstrates the opposite. These bodies exist largely as ceremonial structures, providing titles and allowances to loyalists while real decision-making power remains firmly controlled by the central state apparatus.

The House of Chiefs, presented as a revival of traditional governance, functions largely without authority. It offers symbolic recognition while jurisdiction remains elsewhere.

Power Still Lies with the Administration

If traditional governance structures truly held power, the Fons and traditional authorities of Nkwen and Bambili would naturally lead mediation efforts. Instead, communities find themselves compelled to seek resolution through administrative officials appointed from the center. This dynamic achieves two outcomes:

It reinforces dependence on centralized authority for local dispute resolution. It allows administrative actors to position themselves as indispensable arbiters in conflicts that historically would have been resolved within communities. The result is a continuation of centralized control under a new institutional packaging.

Remembering the 1954–1961 Experience

Between 1954 and 1961, Southern Cameroons maintained functioning local governance institutions, including a House of Chiefs with recognized authority and courts operating independently of executive control.

Communities did not require distant administrators to resolve boundary or land disputes. Local institutions carried legitimacy because they exercised real authority. Today’s structures, many argue, fail to replicate that level of autonomy.

A Wake-Up Call

The Nkwen-Bambili dispute offers an important lesson: institutions that lack real power cannot provide meaningful solutions to local problems.

Communities are now confronted with a choice—continue relying on centralized intervention, or work toward restoring locally trusted mechanisms capable of managing disputes fairly and effectively.

The debate over governance and autonomy continues, but one reality is clear: institutions gain legitimacy not through announcements or titles, but through the authority and trust they command in moments of crisis.

Timothy Engonene
Guest Editor-in-Chief, The Independentistnews