Somaliland and Ambazonia: What One Struggle Can Tell Us About Another

The real question is not why Ambazonia has not yet reached Somaliland’s stage—but whether the international community is willing to confront, early rather than late, the human costs of unresolved political unions and prolonged state violence.

By Steve Neba-Fuh The Independentistnews contributor

When people compare Somaliland and Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia), they are not claiming the two situations are identical. They are asking a simpler and more important question:

What can the experience of Somaliland tell us about how long, difficult struggles for self-determination sometimes unfold—and what outcomes may eventually emerge?

Shared Historical Roots, Different Paths

Both Somaliland and Southern Cameroons were once administered by Britain under international trusteeship arrangements. In both cases, independence did not arrive as a clean, standalone transition. Instead, each territory was merged into a larger post-colonial state—Somaliland with Somalia in 1960, and Southern Cameroons with the Republic of Cameroon in 1961.

These unions were fragile from the beginning. They were rushed, legally unclear, and driven more by international convenience than by genuine consent or carefully negotiated agreements. Over time, political imbalance, marginalisation, and centralisation of power eroded trust in both arrangements.

The key difference is timing and response.

Somaliland’s union with Somalia collapsed into full civil war by the late 1980s. After immense suffering, Somaliland reasserted control over its former colonial borders and began governing itself independently in 1991. Southern Cameroons, by contrast, remained trapped within a centralised state for decades before open conflict erupted in 2016.

Violence as a Turning Point

In both cases, extreme state violence became a decisive moment. In Somaliland, the bombing of cities such as Hargeisa and the mass killing of civilians by the Siad Barre regime destroyed any remaining legitimacy of the Somali state in the eyes of many Somalilanders.

In Southern Cameroons, years of political marginalisation were followed by violent repression of peaceful protests, mass displacement, village burnings, and widespread civilian suffering. As in Somaliland, violence radicalised public opinion and transformed long-standing political grievances into a full-scale struggle over self-rule.

History suggests that when a state turns its coercive power overwhelmingly against a section of its own population, the political relationship rarely returns to what it was before.

The Long Road to Recognition

One of the most misunderstood aspects of Somaliland’s experience is time. Somaliland governed itself for more than three decades before receiving any form of international recognition. During that period, it held elections, built institutions, managed internal conflicts, and maintained relative stability—largely without external assistance.

This matters for Ambazonia because it challenges a common assumption: that legitimacy must come first from the outside. Somaliland shows that, in practice, internal coherence often precedes external recognition, not the other way around.

For Ambazonia, this suggests that the absence of immediate recognition does not, by itself, determine the final outcome. Many liberation struggles unfold over generations, not years.

Conflict, Imperfection, and Reality

Liberation movements are rarely neat or morally flawless. Somaliland’s armed struggle, like those in Eritrea, South Sudan, and South Africa, involved internal divisions, mistakes, and periods of instability. These realities did not invalidate the underlying political claims; they reflected the harsh conditions under which such struggles take place.

Ambazonia’s conflict displays similar complexities. Armed resistance emerged in response to state violence, and with it came fragmentation, criminal infiltration, and tragic abuses. These dynamics are not unique, nor do they settle the question of political legitimacy. History tends to judge such movements less by their imperfections and more by the justice of their core grievance and the conduct of the state they opposed.

What Somaliland Does—and Does Not—Predict

Somaliland does not guarantee Ambazonia’s future. Outcomes depend on many factors: regional politics, internal organisation, leadership choices, and international interests. But Somaliland does offer a reference point, not a roadmap. It shows that: Failed political unions can unravel permanently. Long periods without recognition do not necessarily mean failure. De facto statehood can precede international acceptance. Time, endurance, and internal legitimacy matter as much as diplomacy.

A Question Still Open

Somaliland today stands as a functioning, though still contested, political reality. Ambazonia remains in the midst of its struggle, facing active conflict and humanitarian crisis. The comparison is therefore not about where Ambazonia is, but about what history suggests may be possible over time.

The real question is not why Ambazonia has not yet reached Somaliland’s stage—but whether the international community is willing to confront, early rather than late, the human costs of unresolved political unions and prolonged state violence.

Steve Neba-Fuh for The Independentistnews as contributor. Steve Neba-Fuh is a commentator on decolonisation, self-determination, and African political history.