Cameroon’s opposition landscape remains fragmented. Electoral alliances are rare, and opposition leaders often operate under intense surveillance and legal pressure. Some analysts argue that this fragmentation — likened by critics to “ngong dogs” that inadvertently warn their prey during a hunt — plays into the incumbent’s hands
By Ntumfoyn Boh Herbert
On Sunday, Cameroonians will once again go to the polls. Officially, the electoral commission will announce results, and the Supreme Court and Constitutional Council will certify them. President Paul Biya, who led a notably subdued campaign — limited to a single rally and one major speech — is widely expected to secure another seven-year term, which would extend his rule to his 100th birthday.
For many Cameroonians and international observers, this electoral cycle follows a familiar script: participation and procedure are maintained, but the outcome is effectively predetermined. This perception is rooted in the structure of Cameroon’s political system, the dominance of the ruling party, and the longstanding influence of international actors, notably France, which continues to play a key role in the country’s political and economic life.
Historical and Institutional Context
Cameroon’s complex political identity is central to understanding current tensions. What was once The Cameroons consisted of two territories: French Cameroun, which gained independence in January 1960, and British Southern Cameroons, which was administered as a UN Trust Territory until 1961. A UN-supervised plebiscite led to Southern Cameroons joining French Cameroun in a federal structure intended to guarantee equal status for both entities.
However, subsequent political developments — including the 1972 referendum that replaced federalism with a unitary state — dismantled that framework. Many in Southern Cameroons believe the UN failed to ensure full decolonization, leaving unresolved questions of sovereignty. Today, this unresolved status underpins political grievances, allegations of systemic marginalization, and the ongoing conflict in the Anglophone regions, which many describe as a form of internal colonialism.
The Role of the Incumbent and the International Community
Paul Biya, 93, has been in power since 1982. While the constitution permits his candidacy, critics argue that state institutions, electoral frameworks, and security forces are structured to sustain his rule. Cameroon uses the CFA franc, a currency tied to the French Treasury, and maintains close political and military ties with Paris. Biya himself has spent extended periods abroad, often in Geneva, which has become symbolic for opponents who see him as disconnected from the daily realities of governance.
International responses to Cameroon’s electoral cycles have historically been cautious. Western governments, including France, the EU, and the United States, have often prioritized regional stability and security cooperation over political reform. This has contributed to a perception among opposition groups that external actors tacitly legitimize flawed elections.
Elections as Performance and Control
Political campaigns in Cameroon are typically elaborate, state-backed affairs. Opposition candidates operate in an environment where media access, campaign financing, and institutional support heavily favor the incumbent. While Biya presents himself as the unifying “Lion Man” of the nation, critics argue that this narrative masks a centralized system that rewards loyalty over performance and punishes dissent.
The current campaign cycle reflects these dynamics. With key opposition figures, such as Maurice Kamto, barred from running, the field is fragmented. Eleven other contenders are participating, but their capacity to mount a credible challenge is limited by both structural and legal constraints. Some, like former Prime Minister Bello Bouba, are seen less as genuine challengers and more as political actors positioning themselves for future appointments.
The Tchiroma Factor
One of the most notable developments this election season is the candidacy of Issa Tchiroma, a long-time government spokesperson who left the cabinet in June 2025. Tchiroma’s abrupt rebranding as a reformist — promising federalism, political prisoner releases, and national reconciliation — has attracted significant attention.
Supporters see in him a potential bridge between Anglophone grievances and Francophone reformists. Critics, however, view his candidacy as either opportunistic or a strategic maneuver designed to create the illusion of competition. Historically, similar figures have been instrumental in absorbing political discontent without altering the status quo.
Opposition, Institutions, and the “Ngong Dogs” Effect
Cameroon’s opposition landscape remains fragmented. Electoral alliances are rare, and opposition leaders often operate under intense surveillance and legal pressure. Some analysts argue that this fragmentation — likened by critics to “ngong dogs” that inadvertently warn their prey during a hunt — plays into the incumbent’s hands.
The lion-sheep metaphor often used in Cameroonian political commentary captures a common sentiment: the state operates with predatory efficiency, while citizens and opposition groups oscillate between passive endurance and sporadic resistance. Many Cameroonians continue to hope for genuine electoral reform, but widespread skepticism remains.
Looking Ahead
Sunday’s vote is unlikely to produce surprises. With institutions aligned behind the presidency, opposition divided, and international actors cautious, the outcome is largely seen as predetermined. Yet the symbolism of the election matters. For some, participation remains a civic duty and an assertion of presence within the system. For others, it is a performance that conceals deeper structural issues — historical, constitutional, and geopolitical — that continue to shape Cameroon’s trajectory.
Cameroon’s political stability, now entering its fifth decade under the same leadership, remains both an asset and a liability. It provides continuity, but at the cost of democratic innovation and inclusive governance. Whether this model can endure indefinitely, in the face of demographic change, economic pressures, and unresolved historical questions, remains an open question.
Ntumfoyn Boh Herbert
