BANANA LEAVES TIKO, SIGNATURE LEAVES YAOUNDÉ: The Entente Logic, Paul Biya, and the International System That Learned to Live With Southern Cameroons’ Extraction and Conflict

Britain could obtain its bananas. France could maintain its extensive commercial relationships. The Commonwealth could retain its member. La Francophonie could retain its member. The international system could preserve one sovereign interlocutor. And Yaoundé could retain the signature. No secret treaty was necessary for those interests to converge. The functional arrangement was enough. So yes, something worked. It worked extraordinarily well. The only question is: For whom?

By Ali Dan Ismael, Editor-in-chief The Independentist News

For years, Southern Cameroonians have been told that what is happening in their homeland is a “crisis.” An Anglophone crisis. A security crisis. A sociopolitical crisis. A crisis requiring decentralization, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, another commission, another delegation, another carefully worded communiqué from Yaoundé. Almost anything, it seems, except sustained acknowledgement of the word that the institutions involved increasingly use themselves: conflict.

Britain uses it. The Commonwealth uses it. The African Union has gone further and described what began in the Northwest and Southwest in 2016 as having “mutated into armed conflict” by the end of 2017. France officially describes armed confrontations between Cameroonian forces and secessionists. Yaoundé itself maintains institutions for war victims and speaks openly, when convenient, about the consequences of armed conflict.

The question therefore can no longer be whether the major international actors know what is happening. They know. The more serious question is why an arrangement that has failed Southern Cameroonians so catastrophically has nevertheless remained remarkably convenient for almost everybody exercising political, diplomatic, or commercial power over the territory.

To understand that arrangement, one must look beyond Paul Biya. One must look back to Britain and France. And one must understand what I shall call the Entente logic. The Entente Cordiale: Not the Secret Treaty, but the Political Habit The Entente Cordiale was signed between Britain and France in April 1904. It did not mention Southern Cameroons. It did not mention Paul Biya. It obviously could not have mentioned the modern Commonwealth or Organisation internationale de la Francophonie. Historical accuracy matters.

The Entente resolved longstanding Anglo-French colonial disputes. Britain accepted French ambitions in Morocco while France recognized British predominance in Egypt. Other imperial disagreements were similarly settled through reciprocal accommodation. Britain’s own historical account describes the agreement as settling old colonial differences and inaugurating a new relationship between the two powers.

The significance for Southern Cameroons is therefore not that some clause hidden in the 1904 agreement secretly disposed of Ambazonia. There is no public evidence of such a clause. Its importance lies in the political method it represented. Britain and France had discovered that they could protect their respective imperial interests more effectively by accommodating one another than by continually competing over colonial territory. That was the habit. That was the logic.

And Cameroon would later become one of the places where Anglo-French territorial accommodation acquired direct legal and geographical form.

1919: When the Anglo-French Bargain Reached Cameroon Directly

Following Germany’s defeat during the First World War, the former German territory of Kamerun came under British and French occupation. Then came the document Southern Cameroonians should study very carefully. On July 10, 1919, Britain’s Colonial Secretary, Viscount Milner, and France’s Colonial Minister, Henry Simon, signed a declaration fixing the boundary between the Cameroonian territories placed under their respective authority.

The League of Nations treaty record states plainly that the two ministers agreed to determine the frontier separating the territories of the Cameroons administered by their governments. This is the direct Anglo-French territorial instrument. The 1904 Entente supplied the culture of accommodation. The 1919 Milner-Simon Declaration supplied the Cameroonian line.

Africans did not divide Britain and France. Britain and France divided an African territory. That distinction should never disappear from the historical record. The people living on the land did not sit across the negotiating table as equal sovereign parties. European powers settled the boundary between their zones of authority. From that partition eventually emerged the territory administered by Britain as the British Cameroons—including the former British Southern Cameroons—and the much larger territory administered by France. The flags have since changed. The deeper question is whether the political economy of external accommodation changed with them.

From Partition to Unification

Southern Cameroons later evolved under British administration with institutions, legal traditions, educational structures, political practices, and an English-language public culture distinct from those of neighboring French-administered Cameroun. In 1961, Southern Cameroons entered political association with the already independent Republic of Cameroun. The argument over the constitutional meaning and implementation of that arrangement continues today. But something larger happened over the decades that followed.

The state became increasingly centralized in Yaoundé. And as that centralized state matured, something remarkable occurred internationally. Cameroon joined La Francophonie first as an associate in 1975 and became a full member in 1991. Then, on November 1, 1995, Cameroon became a member of the Commonwealth. Consider the architecture.

The former French Cameroun supplied the overwhelmingly dominant political center. Southern Cameroons supplied the historical British connection. The resulting state gained entry to both international families. France retained a Francophone partner. Britain gained a Commonwealth partner. La Francophonie gained Cameroon. The Commonwealth gained Cameroon. Yaoundé gained both.

And Southern Cameroons remained inside the state whose membership in the Commonwealth could hardly be explained historically without the territory’s British past. This deserves far more attention than it receives. The Two Colonial Networks Meet Again in Yaoundé France has La Francophonie. Britain has the Commonwealth. Cameroon belongs to both.

Paul Biya’s government has been the internationally recognized authority representing Cameroon within both systems for decades. That makes Cameroon an extraordinary institutional meeting point between two former imperial networks. The old colonial boundary once separated British and French authority.

The postcolonial state later brought both historical inheritances under one internationally recognized sovereign government. And where does that government sit? Yaoundé.

That is where the architecture becomes politically fascinating. Southern Cameroons contributes the British historical inheritance. French Cameroun contributes the larger Francophone political structure. Yet the sovereign signature controlling the combined state resides in the centralized institutions of Yaoundé. The Commonwealth deals with Yaoundé. La Francophonie deals with Yaoundé.Britain deals with Yaoundé. France deals with Yaoundé. The African Union deals with Yaoundé. The European Union deals with Yaoundé. The United Nations deals with Yaoundé. Foreign investors deal with the sovereign authority recognized in Yaoundé. And the people whose territory helped make Cameroon a member of the Commonwealth are expected to challenge their constitutional condition through that same centralized authority. How convenient.

Biya as the Lynchpin

Paul Biya did not create this architecture. He did not negotiate the Entente Cordiale. He did not sign the Milner-Simon Declaration. He did not create the League of Nations mandates. He did not administer British Southern Cameroons. He did not create the Commonwealth or La Francophonie. But he became the lynchpin of the contemporary system. A lynchpin does not build every component of a machine. It holds critical components together sufficiently for the machine to continue functioning. For France, Biya’s Cameroon has provided extraordinary political continuity. For Britain, Yaoundé provides a recognized sovereign trading partner. For the Commonwealth, Cameroon remains a member. For La Francophonie, Cameroon remains a member. For investors, ministries and regulatory structures remain recognizable. For international institutions, there is one recognized government. For Yaoundé, there is one internationally accepted sovereign signature covering the entire territory, including Southern Cameroons.

That is why Biya’s longevity matters far beyond the man himself. His regime has provided continuity to an international arrangement that allows external actors to pursue their interests without reopening the constitutional foundations of the state through which those interests are administered.

Britain Gets the Bananas, Then comes the banana.

Sometimes an enormous political economy can be understood through an ordinary commodity. Britain signed an Economic Partnership Agreement with Cameroon that preserved duty-free and quota-free trade arrangements. The British government stated that its market accounted for about 12 percent of Cameroon’s banana exports and specifically highlighted the preservation of tariff-free access. Its own parliamentary analysis said the arrangement could benefit British consumers through lower prices. There is nothing inherently immoral about affordable bananas. Trade can benefit both producer and consumer. But look at the institutional pathway.

The banana grows on productive land. Workers cultivate it. Plantation communities carry the agricultural and environmental burdens. The Cameroon Development Corporation’s banana operations are rooted in Southern Cameroons. Yet Britain does not negotiate a sovereign economic partnership with plantation workers. It does not negotiate a treaty with Tiko. It negotiates with Cameroon. The productive asset sits in one place. The sovereign authority controlling the international commercial framework sits elsewhere. That is the difference between production and productive sovereignty.The banana may leave Tiko. The signature leaves Yaoundé.

A Banana Is an Economic Diagram Follow that banana. Somebody supplies the land.Somebody plants it.Somebody maintains the plantation. Somebody carries disease risk. Somebody harvests it. Somebody packs it. Somebody transports it. Somebody insures the transaction. Somebody finances the operation. Somebody negotiates market access. Somebody controls customs. Somebody signs international trade agreements. Somebody captures the margin. Somebody reinvests—or fails to reinvest—the proceeds. The most important economic question is therefore not simply how many tonnes of bananas left the plantation. It is:

Who controls the value chain? Who owns? Who signs? Who finances? Who insures? Who retains knowledge? Who controls logistics? Who accumulates capital? Who reinvests? Who carries the debt? Who bears the environmental burden? And when the banana reaches London, what durable productive capability remains with the community whose land generated the original value? That is the audit Southern Cameroons needs.

For France, Much of the Rest

France’s commercial relationship with Cameroon is much broader. France’s own Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs describes Franco-Cameroonian relations as longstanding and extensive. It reports roughly 100 French subsidiaries and approximately 200 businesses owned by French nationals operating in Cameroon. The sectors are revealing: oil production, wood and agrifood, public works, banking, insurance, transport and logistics, and retail. French foreign-direct-investment stock has remained above €1 billion in the figures published by France.

This does not mean every French company is an extractor. That would be intellectually lazy. Foreign investment can create employment, transfer knowledge, finance infrastructure, open markets, and contribute to development. But a serious political economist must ask another question.

When so many commercial relationships depend upon continuity of the existing political and regulatory system, how much economic value does France attach to political stability in Yaoundé? Oil matters. Banking matters. Insurance matters. Infrastructure matters.Agribusiness matters. Timber matters. Transportation matters. Logistics matters. Distribution matters. A government with substantial interests distributed across those sectors has every reason to value predictability. And an incumbent regime that has remained in place for more than four decades has certainly supplied predictability.

France Knows About the Armed Confrontation France cannot claim that this economic relationship exists in ignorance of the political conflict. Its own foreign ministry says the protests that began in November 2016 in the Northwest and Southwest evolved into armed confrontations between Cameroonian forces and secessionists, accompanied by human-rights violations, a serious humanitarian crisis, and damage to economic activity. That is France’s language. So France knows.It knows there is armed confrontation. It knows civilians have suffered. It knows economic activity has been damaged. It knows the dispute has endured.

Yet commercial relationships with the recognized central government continue. Again, that does not prove an illegal conspiracy. It demonstrates something perhaps more important. The conflict has not made the existing political-economic relationship sufficiently costly to force a fundamental change in policy. That is the point. Britain Knows Too Britain also knows.

On June 9, 2026, the United Kingdom told the United Nations Security Council that civilians in Cameroon’s Northwest and Southwest continued to bear the brunt of the conflict and called for sustained engagement toward a peaceful solution. So Britain can simultaneously recognize conflict and maintain its commercial relationship with Cameroon. Again, each individual policy may be defensible.

The political-economic question arises from the combination. Britain once administered Southern Cameroons. Britain now recognizes a conflict in the territory. Britain maintains commercial relations with the state whose authority over that territory is contested. Britain signs trade agreements with that state. British consumers can receive tariff-free Cameroonian bananas. At what point does historical responsibility require more than humanitarian concern and diplomatic encouragement? That is a legitimate question.

Commonwealth and Francophonie: The Circle Closes

Then something happened in November 2019 that perfectly illustrates the contemporary architecture. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, and the Secretary-General of La Francophonie travelled together to Cameroon.

The Commonwealth’s own announcement said the mission sought to address the conflict in the Northwest and Southwest regions and its root causes. The delegation met President Paul Biya, Prime Minister Joseph Dion Ngute, political actors, religious leaders, youth representatives, and civil-society organizations.

Think about the symbolism. The African continental organization. The organization rooted historically in the British imperial family. The organization rooted in the Francophone world. All three travelled to Yaoundé. All three dealt with the same central government. There could hardly be a more perfect institutional picture of the system. Britain’s historical network. France’s historical network. Africa’s continental network. Meeting at the same political gate. And who sat at the center? Paul Biya. That is what is meant by the lynchpin.

The Functional Pact

This is where we must be disciplined. It is tempting to call the entire arrangement a secret pact among Britain, France, the Commonwealth, La Francophonie, and Biya. Perhaps future archives will reveal communications, understandings, or bargains historians do not presently know.

But without documentary evidence, an editorial should not present a clandestine agreement as established fact. There is a stronger argument. Call it the functional pact. A functional pact does not require everybody to sign the same document. It exists when the incentives of powerful actors repeatedly point toward preservation of the same system. Britain gains commercial continuity. France preserves extensive commercial and strategic relationships. The Commonwealth retains Cameroon. La Francophonie retains Cameroon. International organizations retain one recognized state interlocutor. Foreign investors retain one sovereign contracting authority. Yaoundé retains territorial recognition.

The centralized political establishment retains control over the international signature. And Southern Cameroons remains inside the productive asset base. No secret meeting is required. Everybody simply has to find the existing arrangement more convenient than reopening the question.

The Mortgage Without a Mortgage Document

This is the sense in which Southern Cameroons can be described as mortgaged. Not because we have produced a literal mortgage agreement signed by Biya and foreign governments. The metaphor describes the economic structure. A mortgage places an asset behind an obligation controlled through a contractual system. Southern Cameroons contains productive assets.Agricultural land. Bananas. Palm oil. Rubber. Cocoa. Timber. Coastal access. Ports. Energy potential. Human capital. Strategic transportation routes. Yet the internationally recognized authority controlling external transactions involving the sovereign state sits in Yaoundé. Foreign governments recognize Yaoundé. Banks recognize Yaoundé. International lenders recognize Yaoundé. Treaties are signed through Yaoundé. Major regulatory authority flows through Yaoundé. The political system therefore allows productive geography and sovereign authority to exist in different locations.

That is the mortgage without a mortgage paper.Extraction Has Changed Its Clothes Classical colonial extraction was relatively easy to identify. The foreign flag flew over the territory. The colonial administrator governed openly.Land was acquired. Plantations were organized. Labor was mobilized. Commodities were exported. The political authority and the extraction system were visibly connected.

Modern extraction can be more sophisticated. The president may be African. The ministers may be African.The flag may be African.The national anthem may be African. Contracts replace colonial decrees. Investment agreements replace imperial instructions. Development finance replaces colonial treasuries. International institutions speak of partnerships. Yet the fundamental questions remain.

Who owns? Who controls? Who accumulates? Who has negotiating power? Who retains technology? Who carries the debt? Who carries the environmental damage? Who captures the highest-value portion of the chain? Who can refuse an unfavorable agreement? Political independence does not automatically guarantee productive sovereignty. A flag can change while the valve controlling value remains elsewhere.

CDC and PAMOL Are Not Just Companies

The Cameroon Development Corporation and PAMOL should therefore be studied not simply as agricultural corporations. They are institutional records of Southern Cameroons’ political economy. Land. Plantation agriculture. Export crops. Workers. Ports. Transportation. Management. Marketing. International markets. Generations of labor. The critical question is not merely whether these institutions produced bananas, rubber, or palm oil. The question is what productive ecosystem was left behind.

Did decades of export create processing industries? Did they create locally controlled finance? Did they create agricultural-technology companies? Did they create equipment manufacturing? Did they create globally competitive logistics firms? Did plantation communities accumulate ownership? Did workers accumulate productive capital? Did revenues produce infrastructure capable of supporting the next generation of industry? Who ate the crop, and who accumulated the capability? That is the difference between extraction and development. The Entente Logic in Modern Dress

Now return to the historical chain.

1904: Britain and France formalize an accommodation resolving major colonial disputes. 1919: Britain and France formally determine the boundary separating the Cameroonian territories under their respective authority. 1961: Southern Cameroons enters political association with the Republic of Cameroun. 1975: Cameroon becomes an associate of La Francophonie. 1991: Cameroon becomes a full member. 1995: Cameroon joins the Commonwealth.2019: the African Union, Commonwealth and La Francophonie travel jointly to Yaoundé to discuss the Northwest-Southwest conflict.

2026: Britain still refers publicly to the conflict while France still describes armed confrontation and maintains an extensive commercial presence in Cameroon. This does not prove that one uninterrupted secret agreement ran from Edwardian London through colonial partition to Paul Biya. History does not need to be tortured into saying what the documents do not say. What it demonstrates is something subtler. The logic of Anglo-French accommodation has proved extraordinarily adaptable.

The imperial arrangement divided territory. The postcolonial arrangement recognizes one centralized sovereign state. The international institutional arrangement allows that state to belong to both the Commonwealth and La Francophonie.The commercial arrangement allows Britain and France to transact through the same recognized government. And the political arrangement leaves Southern Cameroons attempting to challenge a system whose principal external actors have significant incentives not to disturb it.

How Convenient

This is where the word becomes unavoidable. How convenient. Britain can call for peace and still purchase bananas under favorable trade arrangements. France can acknowledge armed confrontation while maintaining major commercial interests. The Commonwealth can speak of its Charter and remain engaged with Yaoundé. La Francophonie can speak of democracy and human rights while remaining deeply engaged with the same state.The European Union can provide humanitarian assistance. The African Union can call for dialogue. The United Nations can manage displacement. Yaoundé can call the problem a crisis. Foreign businesses can continue trading. Everybody can perform his institutional role. And the system survives. How convenient. It Worked—But for Whom? Perhaps this is the most important question of all.

If the system is evaluated according to preservation of Cameroon’s internationally recognized territorial architecture, it worked. If the measure is regime continuity, it worked. If the measure is preservation of a single sovereign gatekeeper for international transactions, it worked. If the measure is continuity of external commercial relationships, it worked. If the measure is continued Commonwealth and Francophonie membership, it worked.

But if the performance measure is peace in Southern Cameroons, the system failed. If the performance measure is restoration of political consent, it failed. If the performance measure is uninterrupted education, it failed. If the performance measure is civilian security, it failed. If the performance measure is preventing displacement, it failed. If the performance measure is protecting productive assets from prolonged conflict, it failed. If the performance measure is creating trust between Southern Cameroonians and the state, it failed catastrophically.

As any competent engineer understands, a system eventually reveals its real priorities through the outcomes it repeatedly protects and the failures it repeatedly tolerates. What has this system protected? And what has it tolerated? Humanitarianism Cannot Become Conflict Maintenance, Britain provides assistance. France provides assistance. The European Union provides assistance. The United Nations provides assistance. Humanitarian assistance saves lives and must continue wherever civilians need it.

But there is a moral danger when humanitarian intervention becomes permanent management of an unresolved political conflict. Treating a wound without stopping the machine producing the wound cannot be called a solution. Feeding displaced families indefinitely while avoiding the constitutional conflict that contributed to their displacement is not peace. Reconstructing schools without creating conditions under which children can attend them safely is not resolution. Humanitarianism should protect life. It should never become the administrative system that makes prolonged political failure tolerable.

Britain Has a Historical Question to Answer Britain is not merely another foreign government. It administered Southern Cameroons. That historical relationship creates questions no trade agreement can erase. What constitutional future did Britain believe it was facilitating in 1961? What protections did it believe the federal structure would provide? When those structures disappeared, what responsibility did Britain believe remained? When Southern Cameroonians later argued that the political bargain had been fundamentally altered, how seriously did London revisit its own record?

When armed conflict finally emerged in the territory Britain once administered, did Britain treat the situation merely as a contemporary domestic problem—or as a conflict connected to an unfinished decolonization history in which Britain itself participated? And today, when Britain recognizes conflict while benefiting from commercial relations with Yaoundé, does economic convenience influence the intensity with which historical responsibility is pursued? These questions deserve answers.

France Has an Even Larger Question France must confront the relationship between political stability and its extensive commercial interests. Again, this is not an argument that every French company is exploitative. It is an argument about incentives. When your companies operate in oil, agribusiness, wood, public works, banking, insurance, transportation, logistics, and retail, political continuity has commercial value.

When a government has remained in power for decades, relationships develop. Networks develop. Contracts develop. Institutional familiarity develops. Risk calculations develop. The question is not whether France secretly controls every decision in Cameroon. The question is whether the cost of fundamentally challenging Yaoundé has repeatedly appeared greater than the cost of tolerating the unresolved conflict in Southern Cameroons. That is an empirical question worth investigating.

Biya’s Greatest Asset May Have Been Predictability

Paul Biya’s greatest geopolitical value may not have been ideology. It may have been predictability. External governments knew who governed. Investors knew where authority sat. International organizations knew whom to recognize. France knew the political center. Britain knew the treaty counterparty. The Commonwealth knew its member state. La Francophonie knew its member state. For all the internal weakness, corruption concerns, conflict, and institutional fragility, the external sovereign interface remained remarkably stable. Biya became the man who kept the signature in one place. That is why calling him the lynchpin is analytically useful. The lynchpin does not own the entire machine. But remove it and the machine must reveal how its components are actually connected. What Happens After Biya? This may be the ultimate test. Biya will not govern forever. No leader does.

When he leaves, watch the international system carefully. Will Britain suddenly reopen the constitutional history of Southern Cameroons? Will France reconsider the architecture? Will the Commonwealth ask whether the historical basis upon which Cameroon entered its family remains institutionally meaningful? Will La Francophonie reconsider its role? Will the African Union insist upon a genuine negotiating framework? Will the United Nations move beyond humanitarian management? Or will the principal actors simply search for another internationally convenient authority in Yaoundé capable of preserving the same centralized arrangement? If the latter occurs, history will confirm something important. Biya was not the system. He was its lynchpin. Do Not Give Them the Escape Route of Conspiracy Theory.

Southern Cameroonians should therefore avoid making the weakest possible version of the argument. Do not merely shout, “secret pact.” Demand evidence. Open the British archives. Open the French archives. Study the Entente Cordiale. Study the Milner-Simon Declaration. Study trusteeship records. Study British correspondence before the 1961 plebiscite. Study French relations with post-independence Cameroun. Study federal abolition. Study CDC. Study PAMOL. Study concession agreements. Study foreign-company ownership. Study banking relationships. Study public debt. Study export flows. Study beneficial ownership. Study trade agreements. Study Commonwealth admission records. Study La Francophonie diplomacy. Study the 2019 tripartite mission. Study what each institution knew and when it knew it. Audit the system. A conspiracy theory asks us to believe without evidence. A political-economy audit asks powerful institutions to produce the evidence. There is a tremendous difference. Southern Cameroons Must Also Learn the Lesson There is another danger.

Suppose Southern Cameroons obtains political independence tomorrow but keeps the same extractive architecture. The flag changes. The anthem changes. The ministers change. Yaoundé is replaced by Buea. But foreign companies still own the highest-value portions of the productive chain. Local commodities still leave unprocessed. Communities still carry environmental costs. Government still borrows irresponsibly. Political elites still sign opaque contracts. Citizens still own little. Technical knowledge still leaves with foreign contractors. Banks still finance consumption more readily than domestic production. Then what exactly has sovereignty accomplished?

Southern Cameroons must demand more than political ownership. It must demand productive sovereignty. Who owns the land? Who owns the enterprise? Who finances production? Who retains intellectual property? Who maintains the infrastructure? Who controls the port? Who develops the technology? Who processes the commodity? Who accumulates capital? Who reinvests? Who carries the debt? Who carries the risk? And after every transaction is complete, what remains for the next generation? Otherwise independence itself can become another layer of extraction.

The Banana Tells the Story

Return finally to the banana. It may appear insignificant beside constitutions, international law, diplomacy, armed conflict, and decolonization. But the banana tells the story. It grows in Southern Cameroons. A worker tends it. A community supports the productive system around it. The fruit enters international trade. Britain benefits from tariff-free market access. The sovereign agreement is made with Cameroon. The recognized signature belongs to the central state. That is the architecture in miniature. The banana may leave Tiko. The signature leaves Yaoundé. And between those two points lies the entire question of Southern Cameroons’ productive sovereignty.

They Cannot Plead Ignorance Britain knows there is conflict. France knows there is armed confrontation. The Commonwealth knows. La Francophonie participated directly in the joint mission. The African Union says the situation mutated into armed conflict. The international system therefore cannot credibly claim ignorance. The question has moved beyond knowledge. What interests have made continuation of the existing arrangement tolerable? What value flows through it? Who receives that value? What political risks would arise if the arrangement changed? Who fears those risks? Who pays for preserving the status quo? Those questions belong at the center of the Southern Cameroons debate.

The Final Audit

The Entente Cordiale did not contain a secret clause giving Southern Cameroons to Paul Biya. Let us not falsify history. The stronger historical argument is more disturbing. The Entente institutionalized an Anglo-French habit of settling imperial interests through accommodation. The Simon-Milner Declaration later divided Cameroon directly between Britain and France. Decolonization eventually brought Southern Cameroons into political association with the Republic of Cameroun.

The resulting centralized state entered La Francophonie. Then it entered the Commonwealth. The two former imperial networks converged again around one state. And during more than four decades of Paul Biya, one government in Yaoundé became the stable gatekeeper through which the international system dealt with the combined territory.

Britain could obtain its bananas. France could maintain its extensive commercial relationships. The Commonwealth could retain its member. La Francophonie could retain its member. The international system could preserve one sovereign interlocutor. And Yaoundé could retain the signature. No secret treaty was necessary for those interests to converge. The functional arrangement was enough. So yes, something worked. It worked extraordinarily well. The only question is: For whom?

Look at the banana. Look at the plantation. Look at the bank. Look at the insurer. Look at the port. Look at the trade agreement. Look at the diplomatic missions. Look at the international institutions. Look at who owns. Look at who signs. Look at who remains internationally recognized. Then look at Southern Cameroons.

A system should be judged by what it repeatedly produces. And after more than a century of partition, political accommodation, centralized control, extraction, conflict, and international convenience, Southern Cameroons does not merely need another explanation of that system. It needs a forensic audit of it.

Ali Dan Ismael, Editor-in-chief The Independentist News