The Independentist News Blog News analysis The selection in LRC’s election: What Ambazonians Need to Know About October 12, 2025 Exercise
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The selection in LRC’s election: What Ambazonians Need to Know About October 12, 2025 Exercise

In the so-called Grand Centre (Centre, South, and East regions) — widely viewed as Biya’s political base — no candidate was allowed to emerge. This ensures that votes in the regime’s stronghold remain consolidated.

By Timothy Enongene, Independentist Contributor, Kumba – Meme County

It is becoming increasingly evident, even to those who were previously unaware, that the Biya regime’s decision to convene an electoral exercise on October 12, 2025, is not primarily motivated by a commitment to democratic principles or good governance. Rather, it appears to follow a carefully choreographed script designed to produce a predetermined outcome. The Constitutional Council is expected to announce results that have been prepared in advance, reinforcing the ruling elite’s hold on power.

Candidate Selection and the Politics of “Regional Balancing”

The regime’s allies shortlisted 11 presidential candidates while disqualifying Maurice Kamto, a formidable challenger. These candidates were deliberately chosen to represent a cross-section of ethnic and regional groups, creating an appearance of inclusivity. For example, Joshua Osih was positioned as a representative of the South West, Akere Muna of the North West, and Mrs. Tomaino Ndam Njoya of the Bamoum. In the Bamiléké region, Kwemo Pierre was chosen, while in the Littoral, Matoumba, Bougha, Iyodi, and Libii were put forward. In the Grand North, Bello Bouba Maïgari and Issa Tchiroma Bakary were selected, although historical rivalries make their collaboration unlikely.

In the so-called Grand Centre (Centre, South, and East regions) — widely viewed as Biya’s political base — no candidate was allowed to emerge. This ensures that votes in the regime’s stronghold remain consolidated. Parties such as Parti Alliance Libéral (PAL) and UNIVERS, notably, invested “Anglophone” candidates and even indicated which alliances they would support. Akere Muna and Ateki Caxton have aligned themselves behind Bouba Bello Maïgari as the so-called “coalition candidate,” in opposition to Issa Tchiroma Bakary, who has also attracted significant support.

This approach is officially presented as “regional balancing” — a mechanism meant to reflect Cameroon’s ethnic and regional diversity. However, this form of balancing is not the same as genuine Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) in democratic politics. Whereas DEI frameworks seek to expand opportunities, ensure fair representation, and address systemic inequalities, Cameroon’s regional balancing serves primarily to manage elites, allocate symbolic roles, and neutralize dissent without genuinely empowering communities.

The Corporate CPDM system exemplifies this distinction. Although the party presents itself as a national integrator, in practice it does not equitably distribute national resources among the regions it claims to represent. Key political, economic, and security levers remain concentrated in the Centre–South–East axis, while other regions are mobilized primarily for electoral optics. This selective distribution of power and resources represents a form of tribalization of politics — the hidden arm of the regime’s “Communal Liberalism” ideology. Rather than fostering true political inclusion, this model maintains hierarchies and entrenches patron–client relationships.

Ambazonians have become increasingly aware of this dynamic. The selective inclusion and instrumental use of Anglophone candidates, without accompanying power-sharing or resource equity, has deepened skepticism toward the CPDM system. What is presented as national integration often functions as controlled co-optation.

Official Messaging and Political Reality

The Minister of Territorial Administration, Atanga Nji, mocked some candidates for lacking national structures, implicitly acknowledging that their role is more symbolic than competitive. Many of these parties are often described by Cameroonian observers as “satellite parties,” serving to lend legitimacy to the ruling party’s continued dominance.

An interesting development is the renewed discourse on “federalism” among certain opposition figures. The chairman of what remains of the Social Democratic Front (SDF) has proposed resolving the Anglophone crisis within 100 days under a federal arrangement. While some observers view this as a sincere attempt to offer alternatives, others argue that it is a strategic positioning effort — aiming to come second in Anglophone regions and thereby secure a role in a future coalition government.

Adjusting to Political Dynamics

The regime did not initially anticipate the growing popularity of Issa Tchiroma Bakary. In response, political actors such as Akere Muna and Ateki Caxton have been asked to align with Bello Bouba Maïgari to consolidate the “coalition” front. This move is designed to manage internal competition and pave the way for a pre-arranged result, likely placing Bouba Bello Maïgari in second place and Tchiroma in third, with modest adjustments to their vote shares.

Following the election, it is expected that Bouba Bello Maïgari and allied figures will negotiate their inclusion in a “government of national unity,” with promises to address the Anglophone crisis among other national issues. Similar power-sharing arrangements have historically been used to neutralize opposition and broaden regime legitimacy without initiating systemic change.

The Ambazonian Dimension

For Ambazonians, this selection exercise resonates with familiar patterns. When Yaoundé abducted and extradited the Nera 10 in 2018, state officials proclaimed the decapitation of the Ambazonian movement. However, a new leadership under Dr. Samuel Sako emerged, reorganizing the struggle along Local Government Area (LGA) and County lines, and embracing self-defence. Instead of engaging constructively with this new leadership, Yaoundé attempted to revive Ayuk Tabe’s leadership from prison, catalysing divisions within the movement.

Over time, the regime has alternated between co-opting or elevating figures such as Ayaba, Anu, and Irene Ngwa to sustain parallel factions. Some of these divisions have been amplified by state tactics; others reflect genuine strategic disagreements within the Ambazonian movement itself. The result is a complex landscape where external manipulation and internal fragmentation intersect — a dynamic similar to the fragmentation seen within LRC’s controlled opposition.

Historical Continuities

Biya’s approach fits within a long-established pattern. The French colonial administration left behind a governance template that centralizes control and manages opposition through controlled participation and elite bargaining. Ahidjo applied this to annex the Southern Cameroons; Biya continues to apply it to preserve power. Ambazonia, however, has studied its past and present and is preparing to assert its sovereignty with greater clarity and strategic discipline.

Strategic Implications

From the Ambazonian perspective, the October 12 exercise is not an election but a recruitment mechanism for new allies of the regime. As Ambazonia consolidates its own governance structures in exile, it must be vigilant against infiltration by fifth columnists posing as supporters. At the same time, the home front must maintain discipline, including adherence to strategic lockdowns, to resist psychological warfare designed to weaken morale ahead of key political events.

The international environment is shifting. A recent BBC News report highlighted that only Cameroon and Eritrea abstained from voting for Palestinian statehood at the UN, raising questions about Yaoundé’s foreign policy positioning. Some analysts argue that supporting Palestine would have indirectly strengthened Ambazonia’s case for recognition, given the parallels between the two struggles.

Looking Ahead

Ambazonia is approaching a decisive phase in its confrontation with La République du Cameroun. While the movement currently holds strategic advantages, sustaining them requires both resilience and effective coordination. Political discipline in the final stages of this confrontation is essential to avoid complacency.

Conclusion

The October 12, 2025 “election” in LRC is best understood as a managed political selection rather than a genuine democratic contest. Its use of regional balancing masks deeper structural inequalities: unlike true DEI frameworks, it neither redistributes power nor ensures fair representation. Instead, it perpetuates the tribalization of politics and sustains the hidden logic of communal liberalism — a system that Ambazonians increasingly recognize and reject.

Understanding this dynamic enables Ambazonians to anticipate political manoeuvres more effectively, maintain internal cohesion, and engage international actors with a clear, evidence-based narrative.

Timothy Enongene, The Independentist

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