In the period preceding the 2025 elections, efforts were made by political and religious elites to encourage participation and present credible “Anglophone” leadership options within the structure of French Cameroons.
By Ali Dan Ismael
Editor-in-Chief, on special assignment, Bamenda, Ambazonia
The political dynamics surrounding leadership in Ambazonia cannot be fully understood without situating them within the broader historical rivalry between France and Britain, two colonial powers whose competing visions for governance have shaped African and global politics for centuries.
Historically, France has consistently sought to project political and cultural dominance over territories beyond its borders, often through centralized administrative control and elite co-optation. By contrast, Britain typically pursued indirect rule, emphasizing local institutions while maintaining strategic influence.
Throughout modern history, France’s attempts to impose its authority over other peoples or rival powers have often failed. Whether in Russia, Egypt, Asia, Haiti, or the Americas, French ambitions to dominate politically and culturally were repeatedly checked — sometimes by local resistance, sometimes by geopolitical realities. Notably, in several critical moments when France was threatened or overwhelmed by foreign powers, Britain intervened militarily or diplomatically to rescue or stabilize France.
This pattern — of recurrent French ambitions, strategic overreach, and British rescue — has persisted for centuries. Yet, despite repeated setbacks, France has rarely altered its fundamental geopolitical attitude. The loss of influence in the Sahel in recent years illustrates the continuation of this dynamic: French military and political dominance is receding, and a domino effect is sweeping across parts of Africa, as states and peoples reassess their post-colonial relationships.
The trajectory is reminiscent of Napoleon’s imperial overreach, which ended with his exile to the remote island of Saint Helena (after a stopover on the Isle of Wight) — a symbol of how grand imperial projects can collapse into isolation. It remains to be seen which metaphorical “island” will mark the final retreat of French post-colonial ambitions in Africa.
Complicating this picture, however, was Britain’s own role in shaping Ambazonia’s fate. At the moment of decolonization, Britain handed over sovereignty not to the democratically elected John Ngu Foncha, but effectively to Ahmadou Ahidjo, the unelected and French-backed leader of French Cameroons. Many observers and Ambazonian citizens interpreted this as a deliberate punishment for Southern Cameroons’ refusal to join Nigeria in the 1961 plebiscite. Britain, fully aware of France’s centralizing tendencies from their long historical rivalry, nonetheless facilitated an outcome that placed Southern Cameroons under a structure it had not chosen. This decision set the stage for the political tragedy Ambazonia faces today.
Within this Franco-British historical context, the case of Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) reflects the same French impulse: the desire to politically control a people who historically aligned with British administrative traditions, even as popular resistance repeatedly frustrates these efforts.
Jua and the Collapse of Democratic Self-Rule in Southern Cameroons
Augustin Ngom Jua, commonly known as Jua, was the last democratically elected Prime Minister of the Southern Cameroons, assuming office through constitutional and popular processes after the 1961 plebiscite. His government represented the aspirations of a self-governing polity within a federal arrangement.
When it became apparent that Jua could not be easily influenced to align with the political and economic agenda of French Cameroons and its French backers, he was removed from office. This marked a turning point: the end of Southern Cameroons’ internal self-government and the beginning of a sustained strategy by French Cameroons to shape Ambazonian leadership structures according to its own political interests.
The Post-Absorption Strategy of Leadership Selection
Following the 1972 referendum and the 1984 constitutional change, French Cameroons adopted a top-down approach to political leadership in the former Southern Cameroons territory. Rather than allowing leadership to emerge organically from Ambazonian society, successive governments sought to promote or select figures perceived as “acceptable intermediaries.”
This strategy reflected a broader pattern within Francophone Africa, where post-colonial regimes, often under continued French influence, favored loyal elites over independent political actors. In the case of Ambazonia, such attempts often collided with the strong sense of political identity and resistance among the population.
Elections and the Legitimacy Gap
The electoral processes in Ambazonian territories have repeatedly been marred by questions of legitimacy. Official voter turnout figures have often been high on paper, while independent observations reported widespread boycotts, notably in areas like Njinikom, where local reports indicated that some polling stations recorded little to no participation.
This divergence between official data and observed behavior reflects a legitimacy gap: while French Cameroons relies on electoral rituals to validate leadership choices, a significant segment of the Ambazonian population has used boycotts and ghost towns to signal political rejection.
The Failed Project to Promote an Anglophone “Bridge Leader”
In the period preceding the 2025 elections, efforts were made by political and religious elites to encourage participation and present credible “Anglophone” leadership options within the structure of French Cameroons.
A prominent figure in this context was Archbishop Andrew Nkea, who actively encouraged mass voter registration and was perceived as seeking to play a strategic role in shaping political outcomes. Several other personalities, including Agbor Balla, Joshua Osih, Akere Muna, Samuel Fonki, Michael Bibi, and Eric Chinje, were at various points positioned—by themselves or others—as potential bridge figures who could reconcile Anglophone concerns with the central state.
However, these efforts largely failed to gain traction among the population. Many Ambazonians remained skeptical of any leadership figures perceived as emerging from within the structures of French Cameroons, rather than from the resistance movement itself. Following the elections, Archbishop Nkea and other advocates of participation maintained public silence, reflecting perhaps both the limited impact of their efforts and the broader political stalemate.
Alleged Political Investments and Strategic Calculations
According to reports within political circles, elements within the central government—including figures around Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh—are alleged to have financed or supported these leadership promotion efforts. The expectation may have been to generate politically reliable leadership in Ambazonia that could stabilize relations with Yaoundé and legitimize the state’s authority in the region.
However, the anticipated return on this political investment did not materialize. The combination of grassroots resistance, organized boycotts, and widespread distrust toward elite-led projects meant that no figure was able to achieve lasting legitimacy through this route.
Eight Years of Resistance and Leadership Vacuum
Over the past eight years of armed conflict and political resistance, French Cameroons has not succeeded in producing a single leader from Ambazonia who enjoys broad-based legitimacy among the local population. Efforts to install prison-based leadership, to infiltrate diaspora movements, or to promote media personalities have not filled the vacuum.
This persistent failure illustrates the structural tension between imposed leadership and popular sovereignty in the Ambazonian context. Political legitimacy, in this case, appears to derive not from appointment or co-optation but from alignment with the people’s political aspirations and resistance narratives.
Conclusion
The historical trajectory from Franco–British rivalry, through Britain’s handover to Ahidjo, Jua’s removal, and the failed 2025 leadership project, demonstrates a continuity of strategy by French Cameroons: to control or influence Ambazonian leadership through selection, co-optation, or manipulation.
Yet this strategy has consistently failed to produce leaders with enduring legitimacy. For any future political settlement, whether negotiated or unilateral, leadership legitimacy will remain a central issue. The Ambazonian population has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to accept or reject leadership figures irrespective of external endorsements. This dynamic suggests that durable solutions cannot emerge through elite selection alone, but must involve broad-based consent within Ambazonian society.
By Ali Dan Ismael
Editor-in-Chief, on special assignment in Bamenda Ambaonia
